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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis i s  an attmept to define the dependence con-
text ual approach. Thi s  approach argues that national devel-
op::ient i s  a n  i n  term ti o;.al pro bl e;:i that should be studied 
from an international perspect i ve. I t  also asserts that 
devel opment and underdevelopment are functi onally linked 
(i.e. , the development of one nation may be a cause of the 
underdevelopment of another a�d vice versa). 
This approach is utilized to exa�ine the national devel-
oprr.ent of Brazil sir.ce i�depcnder.ce i n  1822 t o  1980. Depen-
dence v.-riters propose that Brazil's nati onal development can 
be ":.-:' -sri zed i r.to t�:ree stages. Those are 1) the era of 
exr..,�·t ':-::or.r..·�Y (1222-lS:JO); 2 )  the period of ir.;port substi-
t uticn ( , ,., '1 " - 1 .•· /:. ! . ' • • .. t"'d J ) ,l / ,,.., '- - , - I f ( • • f 
( 1 o ,<,, - - ·,, :- c- r.· ·r. i ) /'-'1 }·· --�- • • • 
the stage of export-led growth 
By th c c ·.J. r J. y 1 5; 6 0 ' s 3 ra z j 1 v: -:i s .f--: c e d \'/ i th t ·.·: o r.rn. j or 
dile��ss. �he cco�o�y ��s �uffrri�g from 7Q� inflRtion (1962-
1964). ':;his w:::.s Greatly ae;gravated by bal'.ince of p�yments 
defi c i t s. �usterity programs, eventually inst ituted by the 
mili tar; rcri�e, were badly needed .  Such programs would in-
evi tably har:n tl:e workers.  \','or}:ers, however, made up the 
politi cal b�sc of the civil ian president, Joao Goulart. 
Goulnrt's sclutio� was to i ntroduce leftist refonns favoring 
The research ei.dc<tvo1·.s to s:.:;·.-, J-,o:; tr.� dyr:c.��,i.cs o: 
import sub�titution industrialization (ISI) contributed 
to these political/econo�ic crises of the early 1960's 
in Brazil. This is accomplished in two w�ys. First, by 
showing how the strategy of import substitution reduced 
the importing capacity of the Br�zilian economy (early ISI); 
a�d s9c0::.d, by de:r!onstratir .
. 
� ho· . ..,· the s::.r..e strc.1te,;.'/ o: :,1_:t:-
st5tuti�3 impo�ts led to a situat�cn where the i��ortatjon 
0 -.. ,., d , · .., ......... :' :4 t er:� ,..., ..... l ,__ .-:- \ · o ...... -- ::i ·� i z .., t i n ....  a I') .j r- -_ -::; � ; ,, .::. -:i ..... r · ,,_ + q <.A " ·- l .. - · ...... � ... -... . ti - ·- \· � • .' 1 • t·..1 ... . ,_ ... ... ... ..... .,, .. , . . ... · · · - ·· :::> ... ., ..... c .... .  - Wot  • • i....•. 
0 f c \ ��: :. � . � 
.. -rrr,,,,t�. 1\i�t-o :-��-) !:).-1-. •I • • •  - ·• �- --- - f .  
i � c r- 3. � �· to .. . . . !!:. I ! �. � : : (� 2 r. 0:. ·: ·•. l :; 
crises represents an assi::i latio:i of the F.1·�� �.:. li·:::.:� roli t.L-
cal appar:1tus to the requisites of a new stage of capi t:-il-
ism called "tro..?:sr.ational capi t�llis:.i." This is cstablisr,cd 
by examining government policies en3cted after the military 
coup d'etat of 1964. These policies include 1) a reduction 
in worker w�3es which increased business profits; 2 )  a res-
trictio� of credit which forced small businesses into bank-
ruptcy; and. J)  encouragement of foreign invcstn:er.t ir: 
·Brazil to finn•.ce the balance of payments deficit. 'I'he com-
binatio� of these policies helped to �aintain tte vitality 
and gro�th of tne Brazilian economy. 
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Hewlett (1980i16) has pointed out that the widespread 
poverty and political repression that have accompa�ied ec­
onomic growth in many underdeveloped countries is'�epeatedly 
justified, by theorists and governments alike, as inevitable 
and temporary costs of growth." Implicit in this statement 
is the fact that economic growth can be subsidized by denying 
the vast �ajority of the population a subsistence wage. The 
exces� capital can be channeled, through the rich, towards 
the financing of industrial expansion in a more or less 
stable social environment maintained by a repressive polit­
ical apparatus. As growth continues the rich can afford to 
raise the absolute standard of living of the masses while 
maintaining their relative economic positions (this is kncwn 
as the "trickling do\\ln effect"). 
The fact that socio - economic roverty and political re­
pression inevitably accc�pany rapid economic growth is well 
grounded in empirical studies. That these conditions are 
temporary, however, may not be true for underdeveloped 
countries. Brazil experienced twenty-five years of economic 
growth at a rate of 8.3% from 19J9 to the end of civilian 
rule i� 1964 (Furtado, 1970:144). Growth increased at an 
annual rate of over 1 Cj duri.:.g t�.e "3raziliar: ;.:irDcle" frcm 
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1968 to 1974. Yet this year in Brazil, the tenth largest 
economy in the world, 280, 000 children will die before they 
reach the age of one. In the face of very poor diets and 
what some call the most dangerous working conditions in the 
world, levels of life expectancy are falling and infant mor­
tality rates are rising. As a matter of fact, 69% of children's 
deaths occuring before the age of five are related to mal­
nutrition, a p�oblem that in 1979 was the cause of some 
12, 000, 000 disorders in children from age two to six years. 
(Dassir., 1979i4?) . 
Kany theorists assert that development is a function of 
rapid economic growth. This is questioned today more than 
ever as a result of such low standards in the quality of 
life. Rapid economic growth has coincided with an overall 
�orsening of the quality of life in Brazil. In light of t�e 
obsolescence of this assumption, many researchers have 
shifted their emphasis from national to international var­
iables that explain the relative underdevelopment of Latin 
American (peripheral) covntries with respect to more techno­
logically advanced (center) countries, especially the United 
States. These researchers employ the dependence approach. 
DE�INITICN OF CONCEPTS 
The purpose of this section is to define important con­
cepts and develop the theoretical foundation on which the 
remainder of this study is cased. 
1 ·) 
Tile� :-1prr0nch is a g.1.0bal one and as �uch thccc is :1n attl'.'mpt 
A i'.' o l '1. d Sy r:; t -. m .. - .. - - . ,_ -
···i· '}1J· n · ·-c � ·,,,- .. � �·-c·.,, ,��----· .-· .. 'k t'·c \"orJd • t l,, . l· J ' t..:. • ..:. '..: " ! ..... L ! ! ,, '-' .._ • • ... 'JI - • I l) '· l :. ' . - not n.a t.i ons-
:·.-·cl i',)i ··, :1 �'· ·11:.6 (1Ply i.y pe of sccial 
..::•· ·! •"' ; .. . ., " ")1·lcl ···" "' '. :J ::: J  ! l ..... ') . ... •, • '· ' . ;/ J � � • ' . • 
·-.111 ti •)le ··•;11••• "l .-";· · '  -�. " • 0 - - .4. .. I " .. , - ..... J "- 0 
• ".1 1 1 I ' • ! ' '. '1 ( -j l°) •"J / J ' -. I' 0 ) ( '1 c .rl i .1  n ."'') a . \.. · • ' ' ' ' ' . /( ' , _)/ ...... ·� 
. . �J .. l �j ·- \ .. ::i �--1 I "  1,! c 
it would h:::i.ve to e:·:hibit (as all I.rue :5y::>t ·:-is do) runctio:1:-il 
u.nity. �f'his would imply that a n:ition i"s somehow irr:!r.une fi.·o:n 
i·:o1:ld-sy:_; tc.·�:1 is t::�i t ucc��t�!..-c �{iC ·.·ioi:ld, as opposed to ne. tlons, 
t;ot?s throu.Jh staces, it is iinpossibl e for a state 1..o be dom-
i�1::ited by fcite1al �lC•'lents in a capita.list ';.:orld -ccor:L�r:1y. A 
soci�ty :r.ay !1ave :cud:-i.l or !;oci:::i1ist forces at ·.-:ork in it but 
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logical sense to ask i f  a country can go from feud�li sm to 
soc i a l i sm wi thout passing through capi tal i sm. The problem of 
s tage skipping i s  put more simply by Wa llerstein (19741390). 
He notes that there i s  no such thing a s  a "natural history" 
in a naticn stat e .  Because the proper entity for compari son 
i s  the world-system, the question about st�ge skipping i s  ir­
relevant. "If a stage can be skipped , i t  i s  not a stage and 
we know that a posteriori . "  
It i s  possibl e to i d e ntify d ifferent world-syst ems 
throu�hou t hi story. �all erstein (1974) suggests that up 
thrcugh the si xteenth century the world could be characterized 
as a feudal world-empire . �orld empires had a common pol-
i t i cal system with the redistribution of re sources administer­
ed by the center ( the center of politi cal power ) . The great 
civil1zations of China, Rome and Egypt made up forner �orld-
em pi res .  
h second system i n  the Wal l e r�t e i n  taxonomy i s  the cap­
i tali st world-e ccnomy.1 �ithin thi s system there i s  no 
co��on pol i t ical system and the marke t  becomes the predominant 
channel for trad e .  Beca�se of i t s  unstable structure s ,  the 
world-e conomy was susceptibl e to ''d i s i ntegration or conqu e st 
by one group and hence tra.nsforr..a ti on i nto a world-empire." 
(�allerstein, 1974:390) It was when capitalism brought 
about the "fu ll developr.-1ent and econom i c  predomi na ;.ce of rr:rir­
k et trade" t�at the capi talist world-economy, in t!':e sixteenth 
century, beco�es t�e new �orld-s;ste�. 
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Although one trait of a strong world-economy is decentral­
ization, there have been nation-states that were more dom-
inant throughout history such as Britain and France during the 
nineteenth century.2 The United States was dominant from 
1945-1965. Ironically, it is at the tiree when the biBgest 
capitalist power loses its top position that the capitalist 
world-economy is consolidated. Today the world-system is 
dominated by the United States, �estern Europe, Japan and 
Russia. It is this decentralization that has put the present 
world-economy in its strongest state ever. 
Dependence and Dependencia 
This section wil l try to define the dependence perspective 
and distinguish it from the modernization perspective. 
Following this discussion an att<:mpt is made to exa:nine the 
theory of dependencia. At the outset, it is cruci�l th�t the 
deper.dence perspective and dependencia theory be distin5uished. 
:agen notes that the dependency perspective ( or contextual 
framework ) is "not • . •  a theory of politics or political change 
but rather an orgRnizing perspective on where to look for the 
basic dyr.a�ics that shape regimes." (�ager., 1977110) Depen­
dencia theory is about dependence. Dependence is simply a 
historical-structural approach to the study of relations with-
in the world-economy on an inter�ational level . 
�hat �akcs the d�pe�dence pers�ective a historical-
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structural approach is best sur.j:ned up by Sunkel 8-nd Paz in 
their work "El �ubdessarrollo Latinoarr1ericano." 
Both underdevelor�ent and development are 
aspects of the sa�e phenomeni, both are 
historically simultaneous, both are linked 
functionally and, therefore, interact and 
condition each other mutually. This 
results • • •  in the division of the world 
between i�dustrial, advanced or 'central' 
countries, and the underdeveloped, back­
ward or 'peripheral' countries. (Valenzuela 
and Valenzuela, 19781544) 
\:ithin the dependence contextual fra�ework it makes no 
logical sense to talk about first, second or third worlds.3 
To divide nations into "worlds" only serves to hide the 
functional linkages between these countrie� and how they 
contribute to one a�other's o�n develop�ent (or underde-
velopment). The use o:' "ce:r.ter," "periphery" taxonomy 
is mo�e faithful to the historical-structural relations 
within the present world-economy.system. 
The ce�ter is "viewed as capable of dynamic development 
respo�sive to internal needs, and is the main beneficiary of 
t:'.e global links," while the periphery is "seen as having a 
reflex type af develo��ent, one which is both con2trained by 
its incorporation into the clobal system and which results 
from its adaptation to the requirements of the expansion of 
the ci?nter." (Val �nzuela and Valenzuela, 1978: 544) In 
addition to the center-periphery concept, interestingly is 
Wallerstein's suggestion t�at the present world-economy h�s 
given rise to a "semi-;'erirr.ery." 
':'he se:-:i-peri:;::-:c-r:: :s :;ct essential eco;:o:-:-:ically but it 
\.�1c :.:•:,1:1d·-ccor:orny '-'O i_t1s the lffoblc·m of dc:::i.ling with a 
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po1n·:i?.•'d syst0m. The sr..mi-phc1'ipher-y t:--tkes on t.he role of 
' !") ' . -
�::r.ke of the politic;1.l !:'!'..-::.bi.lity of ihe v;orld-t';c:·o:�o:;,y, ·_: . :o 
D r· e ::i t work to pre s 0 rv e :·»L H b i_ 1 i t y- 1 \ ...,, ; ! ne 
�) the 1_ d , olo3i.ccil cc:r .. r.5_1:·.,.nt to tho �ystc:m by its "c�1d1'es" 
\: .' . .  1 , . " _. ' - i "1 1 ,--, , : , , , ! : i' / 1 • I·. 0 r:; ) ' I • o \.,.. 1_ I' '• � • �· ( • 1 ..J J _/ 
Ey dependence we rnc·;·:.n a si twl t.ion Jn 
which the t�cono�nics of certain •ountries 
is Cl)ndi tioncd by the develor:;no:it and 
c:xf;::.nnion of another econc:ny to ""hich 
tLe f on:icr is sub jec Led. The r·cla t 'i.on 
of i �1tc�:cdt:pt"�:d ·;�·:cc h!·t:·::ccn t hcsc r•.nd 
•:.urld i.1·0d.;! • ;1 :··�»_::··.c:·s the fo1·m of de-
,,. 11,1,� ·1 ·1 c •"' ,,.1-,<'n . . , .... "' .. -,·l i ·- 1 L ·1� ·L r·s f 111e (1 1 " 1 · 1 -i ·, ,,ll"' t 1 • . ' • ... -· .,,. • • .  . . .. · I . '-.,; \ • .. .. .. \ ••. ,,,. • ..1 ,I ... • , 1 
· ·' ' " ) C""' ,. , .. , . ., � .. , cl <·"n ., ,..., .-·0lf '._I .. .  {., , ) , \. , :, ' '" 4 t l _ .. - l • • . . .• •¥' l. \;:; .. ) ,• -
: ·�:;:_;1ini :1:�. \·:llilc 0t:·.er �u'n1·�ri.Gs ( the 
, 1 l"' • " ' n .. � "' n : (' ' ) · ' "' ) • .. ,, ..., < 1 o ; h i c t) n l y n s • .� ; l' \ · • ,. \ C. \ . ,. J ,I , , (. "'"} ..,; , .. i 1 , J, • _ "'-' ( 
a refJ.ect ion of t!:at exp<::n.sion, which can 
have ci U1·�r a positive or negative ef rcct 
On t�·e1· r ·1· . . ,, .. � )· '' � e � � \' " 'l " 1- · •"'' r1t (l'c)"' ! I � ... : II 0...: H . ..... .. - l, •..:; '-= ·-· ·' .. : (# • .; � 
Sr1ntos, 1970: 2Jl) 
n ... _ "' " ,.. � ,.,. ..... r. e � }1 · ' 1 · e "" · ' r e i c : .., _,, 1.:1._: ....... il-c: .  J f l .. , .... .. .Lv f _u u. s.ituatio!"l. Ge pend c ncy, u:! lhe 
otl':er i:;�r:d re:\::rs to the process by "·:�.ich less cle:vclL·_:;.::d 
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the "structural distortions" th:.Jt re sult . · 
Jhe �odernization Perspective 
The heart of the modernization p ersepctive is found in 
the assu�ption that social organi zati on and value systems in 
a naticn-sta t e can be characterized as either traditional , 
modern or SOir1ew!1ere in betwE-en. 
Since societies are understood to move from 
traditional to �odernity, the ideal typical 
dicho to my constitutes the polar ends of an 
evolutionary continuum, though a t  some 
point incremental chan�es give way to a 
qua litative jump to modernity. 
l Valen zuela and Valenzue la, 19781537) 
The most crucial implication flowing from the evolutionary 
continuum, and what distinguishes dependence studies from 
moiiernizaticn studies is tha.t r:.odcrnizationists assume 
that the unit of a nalysis in studying unde·rdevelop:-:-.ent is the 
1-.ational society. Defencence writers deny this zsst<mpticn 
err.pr.atically, and this constitutes ·.\·hat they see as the r.1a j or 
problem with the approach. 
A�other problem with t�e modcrni�ation pe rspective lies 
with the evolutio�ary continuum itself. When employed, the 
tradi tional-;:'?oderni ty schemata dcr.:on�.!:lt es a proclivity 
towards the for�ation of logical truths, resulting from the 
assu�ption "that t!ie values, institutions, and patterns of 
acti on of tradi ti c nal society are both an exrrcssion a�d 
cause of underdeve loprr,ent ., • •  " (Va] er.zuela ar:d \'aler�zuela, 
1978s5]9) Eecsuse t�ey define both modernity and tr�diticnal-
is;ri in :·,i.;ch t�.e sa;.e way the cc!'":C1..'Fts h·. ve :.ccn q:•eraticr.-
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alized (i.e. traditionalisma "extended kinship structure 
with a multiplicity of functions, little spatial and social 
mobility, a differential stratification system, mostly pri­
mary econcrnic activities • . .  and undifferentiated pcli t i  cal 
structure with traditional elitist and h5er:....,.1e:hic;:;l sources of 
authority, et c."- Valenzuela and Vale1:zuela, 1978s537.) ::.cd-
ernizationists ha.ve developed a paradigm where both cause and 
effect are the same- a tautology. 
The natural tendency of the traditicnal-�odern con­
ceptual fra�ework tcwards circular reasoning (posited above), 
as well as its focus on naticnal rather than international 
determinants limits the rn0derniz�tion approach. Because it 
ignores the historical devcJop�ent of a world systen by 
necessarily denying the co�nition t�at development and 
u�derdeve}cp�ent are causally linked, t his approach is in­
appropriate for t�is �nalysis. 
�ependencia Theorv 
The theory of dependencia spa�s fro� the sixteenth cen-
tury to the present. Because of their 1 :·eoccupa ti on with the 
capitalist world-economy, dependistas draw rr.uch of their 
theoretical basis from OCarxism and the �arxist-Leninist 
.. h f . . l. L .2ory o i�per1a ism. �s Valenzuela and Valenzuela �o:�t 
out, ho�eve�. the e�phasis of depe�dencia writers o� �he ax-
pa�sive nature cf capitalism conti�ues net t o  explain t�e 
rr.e�1t of thi:: pe�':..r:-.ery (esp€·cially :..atin /.:�.erica). 
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The re la ti ve underdevelop:i.ent of the peripr.ery is mair.-
tained through its asymmetrical relations with the center. 
The formation and establishment of such relations has con-
tri buted to \·;hat one author calls· "the develo; ment of 
underdevelopment" whichs 
• • •  is the view that the economic structures 
o f  contemporary ur.derdeve 1 oped countries 
is not the form whj ch a "traditional" soc­
iety takes u�on contact with "developed" 
societies, not an earlier stage in the 
11 t ransi ti on" to industrial i za ti on. It is 
rather the result of being involved in the 
world-economy as a peripheral, raw-material 
producing area • • •  " (Wallerstein, 1974aJ92) 
Although there is not total 2Greement between dependistas 
as to what dependencia theory actually does postulate, there 
are so�e central assertio�s t�at Fagen ider.ti�ies as co�mon 
throu�ho ut dependency �ri ting . 
�irst, underdevelopment is seen as an i�tern�ti0:.�l 
problem. The author points out that conditions th� t preva il 
in t he �eriphery can only be understood when its relation 
with the center are fully analyzed. Valenzuela and Valenzuela 
echo this cla im. 
Contrary to soffie nss��ptio�s in cco�omic 
theory the internal division of labor did 
not lead to ;�rallel develoFment through 
co�parative advar.ta6e. The center states 
gained at the e xpense of the periphery . 
But, just as siGnificantly, the different 
f�nctions of c�nter and periph eral soc­
ieties had a profound effec� on the evol­
ution of internal social and political 
structures. (Valenzuela and Va 1 enz ue la, 
19781545) 
A second asEertion is th�t the relaticn of social cl2�scs 
1-11 
to "prodllcti on, consurr,pti on, politics, and the process es of 
change" must be studied in terms of the na ti(:nal-
international interactions described above. Here again, the 
other theorists concur with Fagen. The Vale�zuela article 
argues tr.at it has been r�re for local interests, strong 
enough to fllrsue a successful policy of se lf-sustained <level-
oprr.ent, to establish themselves in the periphery. The 
authors point out that class situations emerging from a society's 
peripheral economic status t.as fostered local interests that 
tend to preserve and rearticulatepatterns of dependency-
pa tterns that are many tir..es coincident with ti1eir interests. 
The final com�on nssertion concerns unequal relations 
bet-.·:ee·n r.ations a:1d wit::in :he peri:r;:-.eries. Far:;en (1977:8) 
dr-sc-ribes this co::::r.on thread stating tr.at 
• • •  �acroconsequences of rel� tionships be­
tween un�quals- at least i� circumstances 
where the capitalist mode of production 
prevails- are the pyramiding and inten­
sifying of the existing inequalities , 
lead ing to wideni�g gaps, the fragment­
aticn of cc��uniti es and decreased relative 
autono�y for the weak . 
Authors s�ch ns Celso ?�rtado (Ctstacles to Development in 
Latin !.rr.erica ) and Su:::uel L. :Sailey �the U.S. and �he Devel­
opment of South h�erica ; 1945-1975) join in this, a sserti�g 
that "the difference between the sta.;;dard of living in I.s tin 
America and in the rni ted Sta tes has beccme proges sively 
greater." 
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Historical forms of Dependencjl!_ 
Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1978) tra 6e the historical 
developnent of dependence, beginning in the sixteenth cen­
tury, as passing through four stages thus far with respect 
to Latin /,rr.erica - 1) the "r-.ercantilistic" colonial period 
(c. 1500-1750): where production was not di rected towards 
the needs of either the national consumers or local pro­
ducers, rather to the needs of the colonial centers who 
monopolized land, mines and manpower in the cclony; 2) the 
period of "outward growth'' (c. 1750-1914): <leper.dent on 
capital from the export of primary goods (such as coffee 
in Brazil); J) "tr.e period of the c risis of the 'liberal 
model '" (c. 191�-1950): also k!1cv.n as the c.ge of "impcrt 
substitution" whereby internal indt.:strialization is stim­
ulated by the peripheral nation's inability to ir:.:i;ort manu­
factured goods; and, 4) "transnatio:ial capitalism," also 
called techno-industrial dependence (Dos Santos, 1970:232): 
the curren t  stage of dependence in which Transnaticnal 
Corpor-ations (TNC' s) begin investin�$ i!1 industries directed 
towards the internal m8rkets of the perip�eral countries. 
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978:546-550) 
Transition into this final stage of develop�ent w2s 
precipitated by rapid econof'!'lic recovery in the center and 
even stron;er transnational corporatic�s seeking cheaper 
production sites and new rrarkets. (V�lenz�ela, et. al . ,  
1978:549) A nother reason for t�e trarsition was the 
t · 1 J 
previously 
?i.i.�st, the invcst1�H�nt by 'l"NC's in m:::i.nufacturing in the 
p; rip'.:ccy Jed to cultivation of the internal market to c;oods 
once �-;old in the 1.:cn t er. This i,.vas, as one author put it , 
nations." In turn, they t·E;ceive exroTt p·.'o.fils f1·em 
tr<1di ti onal raw ;•_a terials and 'L'i'!C rn;.:.;1u facturt?d i t: -:·1:s. 
'I ransna tional depcndf.mce, the "new depend cnce" in :"los 
' 
�><-mtos·' wonis, Ins been (;'SpcJci.ally penetrating in co1mtries 
I "'1) ''n '1" ') i · �, Z )• 1 ) \ ..J . (_. � 




';'hi.s 1..u:.hi:,.:1ti1)n f:H::ilitated the lowering 
to this )�ew direction of Dr=-!zili<-=.n development. 7he effect 
of nc·11 der:cndence in Drazil hA.s been described as "associ�ltcd-
dependent developi-;-.ent" by Cardoso (197J). In Cardo�;o's vi.c•:1 
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situation whereby Brazil enjoys a dyn;:i.rr,ic economic develop­
ment at the cost of being dependent upon foreign investors 
(TNC's). 
S'I'hT::!•:E�T OF OBJECTIVES 
According to dep��dence writers, the national develop­
ment of Brazil falls into three stages since independence 
in 1822. Those are 1 )  the era of the export economy (1822-
1930) J 2) the period of import subs ti tu ti on ( 1930-1964); and·, 
J) the stage of export-led growth (1964-present). 
The primary objective of this thesis is to analyze the 
national development of Brazil using the dependence contex­
tual approach. 
This author proproses three hypotheses �hich are related 
to the primary objective. First, this thesis wi 11 a tterr1pt 
to show that the dependence approach contributes to a better 
understar.ding of the development process of Brazil. 
By the early 1960's Brazil w�s faced with two major dil­
e�rnas • . The econo�y was suffering from 70% inflation (1962-
1964), greatly aggravated by the balance of payment deficits. 
husterity prograns, eventually instituted by the military 
regime, were badly needed. Such programs would inevitably 
harm the workers. �orkers, ho�ever, made up the political 
base of tr.e civilian president, Joao Goul�rt. Goulart's · 
solution w�s a leftist move�ent favoring wo�kers over em-
;; lo ye rs i:. deal ir.g -.·:i th t'.-." eco�·.orr:y. This 2. uthor wi 11 at te:r:pt 
1 - 1 5  
t o  show how the d:,.'nami cs. o f  import subs t i tu t i o n  industrial­
i zation (1930- 1964) contributed to the pol itical/economic 
cri ses of the early 1960 ' s . 
Finally, th i s  author hypothes i zes th�t resolution of 
these crises can be explained as an assi mi l ation of the 
Braz ilian political system to the requi s i t e s  of a new 
staGe of capitali sm .  The new stage of captialism i s  trans­
national capitalism ( d e s c r i bed i n  the previ o u s  sect ion ) . 
Resolution of these crises has led to the establishment o f  
export-led growth in Bra z i l .  
STATE�ENT OF SOURCES 
Because of availability th i s  thesis � oes not rely 
r. cavily on primary sources . : ·  .. c:t of the sources used are 
�· ':'c·0; ·' � �y . : : cw .r s r·""�r 2:.d ; · ,_1 ° 1 1 0  ..... 0 975 ) ,  ! �� s s i n  ( 1979) 
��d �i lki e ( Qd. - 1 980 ) are t he 0�ly pri�ary sour c e s  this 
�: ·J tL o r  h�.!s U!:: Cd. T ,..., :: r� d i t i 0n , : �· · ·: :.. \·e: r ,  i t  .sh0uld be noted 
that so m e worAs wc>re wri tten C'J fv ;·::: c r  e;cvcrn:ient officials. 
!1 1 v e s  ( 1972 ) ,  a for.::er conrsre s : · :�.:- n ( s c  e f oot!1ot e 7 ,  chapter 
I I ) , and Furtado ( 1965; 197 0 ) ,  : ! .  c f O!':-:-.e r pJ r=.r.ni!1g mini st e r  
under the Goulart regime, make up those sources . 
The author' s  remaining books and a r t i cl e s  can be put 
in two broad categori es. First are those related to concep­
tual proble!:!s ( i . e . dependence and the world-system ) .· I t  
�ould be productive for those i n t e r e s t e d  i n  dependence to 
c;o to the w i nte-r i ssue of J :1t P.r-';! 7..) 0nP.l GrFR n :  7.8ti on�. This 
i s�ue ,  d e voted entire l:/ to the J ·- 1 ·s- n d ecne 2r:prcach , incl udes 
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scholarly i n t ro d 1.: c t ory a rt i cl e s  l i ke Capor�� s o  ( 1978), Fagen 
(1978) , and Duva l l  (1978) . I n  addi t i on tp t h e s e  Card o s o  
(197J) , Valenzuela and Val e nz u e l a  (1978) and �al l e r s t e i n  
(19741 1976) a r e  bri l l i a n t  works. 
S econd are a nu:nbe r  o f  works d ea l i n[; w i t h  B ra z i l .  Some 
are s t r i c t ly h i s to r i ca l  whi l e  o thers employ t h e  h 1 s t o r i c a l ­
s t ru c tural m e th o d  t o  d e v e l o p�ent i n  B ra z i l .  T h e  p e r i o d i ca l  
Current H i s tory d e v o t e s  one i ssue each year t o  recent events 
i n  La t i n  Amer i c a .  A number o f  them were u se d  t o  p i e c e  toget-
her t h e  current h i s t o ry o f  Bra z i l .  �orks employing t h e  
h i stro i ca l - s t ructural m e t h o d  o f  analy s i s  are par t i c u lary 
h elpfu l .  F o r  B ra z i l ,  t h e s e  i nc l � d e  D o s  S H n t d s  (1974) , Evans 
(1976; 1977; 1979), H e w l e t t  (1975; 1978; 1980) and � a l l e rs t e i n  
r 1 r· '"< n )  ' ; .....; ..... . 
: . - . :.T 2'.JO�CG Y 
Depend c:n c e  i s  c..n i� ·, l s-1·n:..:. t i  -:i::ial c p;:roa ch t o  n<:! i i  or;�l 
d e vel opment. I t  e!rtl o:,'s 2. spr.ci f i c  :·:c: t. h 0 d o l ogy c a l l e d  
of structur e s ,  t h e i r  func t i ons a n d  �ho t h ey bene f i t o r  h � v e  
benefited o v e r  t i � e .  T h i s  t h es i s  u s e s  t h e  h i s tori c a l -
stru ctural ffi e t h o d  w i t h i n  t h e  d ependence persp e c t i ve t o  
analyze t h e  devel opment o f  Braz i l .  
There are a num � e r  o f  contributi ons t o  t h e  study o f  
po l i t i cal s c � �n c e  i 11 t h i s  t h e s i s  o t h e r  th�n t h e  � o s t obv i ou s i  
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and forr.-:r:o s t , by di s tinc;ui shing between the d e p e ndence 
and rno d e rni z a t i on a pproaches one bccomes
'
aware o f  alternatives 
to the s t udy o f  d e v e l o i �ent a nd underdevelopment. S e condly , 
t h e  histo r i cal-s tructural m ethod is mere useful f o r  the 
s tudy o f  transnati0nal r e lati ons than behavioral. i s m ,  which 
is micrc s o c i ologi c a l  a nd t ends not to co n s i d e r  structures 
and nat i onB l i nterests . The histo r i cal-s tructural m ethod i s  
macro s o c i o l ogical and i s  rnuch more conducive to studying 
s t l·uc tures and aggregate interests.-
FOOTNOT�S- CHAPTER I 
1 T h e  term "world - e c onomy" h a s  proliferated throughout 
l i t e rature en worl� affa i r � .  The ful l i m p l i c a t i o n s  of i t s  
u s e  tavP rarely b e e n  examined i n  t h e  works t h i s  student hns 
come acro s s .  
2 Nation-states became t h e  m o s t  important p o l i t ical uni t 
( a c t o r )  i n  t h e  wo rld-economy. T h i s  h a s  led t o ,  i n  � a l l e rs t e i n ' s  
( 197� : 405 ) word s ,  the false inference that c l as s e s , r e op l e s ,  
and ethni c groups are antional ( na t i o n- st a t e s )  pheno�ena. 
11Both c la s s e s  and ethni c groups , or status groups ,  o r  e thr.o­
nations , are phenomena of worl d - e c onomi e s  and ffiUch of t h e  en­
ormous confu s i o n  that h a s  surrounded the concrete ana ly si s 
o f  their functioning can be a t tributed qui t e  simply t o  the 
fact that they h a v e  been ana l y z e d  � s  though they e x i s t ed 
w i thin t h e  na t i on-state • • •  i n s t ead o f  wi thin the worl d - e c onomy 
a s  a whole . "  
J Robert D .  Steade ( " �,:He ' s  and t h e  Cl-.<-i;-�ging ·;;orld 
Economic Order" in \·.'or}Q_p_g_lt!'..i c s_£_0Lf.1 )  l i s t s  f i ve v;crl c s .  
T h r e e  wi l l  no l onder s u f f i c e  a s  a ch�r�cteri z 3 t i on o f  8 1 1  t h e  
world na t i on s .  OCeanwt i l e , wi thin t h e  dependence theo�e t i cal 
fra�ework , all �a t i ons remain e i t h e r  domi��nt ( c e n 1 e r )  o r de ­
pendent ( s emi-peri pheral and feriphera l )  i n  t h e  pre s e n t  
v:orld-ccor.omy . 
CP.hPTER I I  
H I STCR! CAL 9AC�GROUND: 19)0-1980 
I I .  
T h i s  chapter d e s cribes pert i n e nt historical events i n  
B ra z i l .  T h e  author begins w i t h  t h e  year 1930 b e c � u s e  i t  was 
t h en ttat the pol i ti cal forc e s  supporting industri� l i z � t i o n  
came t o  power for t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  over a powerful agrarian 
o l igarchy. This o l i [ q rchy was made up of landed e l i t e s , 
e s p e c i a l ly the b i g  c o f f e e  growers o f  S a o  Pau l o .  
'I':-�e deve l O !-'!'T!ent of infra structure u �:t] e r  the Bri t i s h  
( 1 870- 1 91 5 ) ,  t h e  aboli t i o n  of slavery i n  1888 ( wh i c h  freed 
� a s s i ve a�ou�ts of capital ) ,  and the drops i n  t h e  p r i c e of 
c o f fe e  a t  the turn of the c e nt rury ( s ee p�ges J-2 t o  3-J ) 
a l l  stl �ulat ed do� e s t i c  i�dus t ry .  N o t  unt i l  1 9 J O ,  howeve r ,  
� ere nat i ona l - industria l i s t s  able t o  s e i z e  powe r .  
G:::TlJLIO V/,RGAS 
By 1930 E ra z i l  devel o ; e d  a system whereby the 
pres id ency r o t � t e d  between the three m o s t  powerful s t a t e s ;  
�ao Pa u l o ,  � inas G er i a s  a�d R i o  G rand e d o  S u l .  I n  1930 
�ashi�gton Lui s ,  a Fau l i s ta1 , t r i e d  t o  inte rupt t h i s  
system by c�oosing J u l i o  ?rest e s  �s h i s  s u c c e s s o r  a n d  k e e p  
5 i t ua � i o � .  t h e  o t h e r  �wo s t a t e s  di rectly cha l l en;ed t h e  
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t i  en , } :ad vi sions o f  d i c t a t o ;-:-::; h i p .  T h e  " ·,"cnc·:-r t c s 11
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r:. o \ t.: (· ! 1 t , 
a [ ::ov.p o f  young rad i c a l s  ( cvc?nt t:_;� l ly h.u·;; c d  coi;.:::uni s t  Ly 
tL !-! i. :c l c-<� d 0 r  Lu i s  Ca�c.los Pi.'t?�3 t es )  ·.-:}�o were pushing f o r  n: �n·c 
1,y f � ..., 1n1" l i" .1..L " r�y C'1 1  \'·1 ·1 ·"  .. 1 '-' 1 1·· ·· \ , · " l f t .. , •• - . · •• ) 1 ·;_ . 1 · : l · t1' , ,  '"' Ii "-' , . , 1  � , ( · t�<- v  . _. \  ... . . ... ,, l-. i s  
i i )'. l :"> ": '.·'·:·) . . ; ·q·> ;-...d i 'r� e '- n c:...- 1· ..., , , 1· ·,·1 u o f ..., ·�1··1·�0 1 1 0- C t' 1· ) 'L 1 ·r: l ! ·] < (l' f r· 1". 1 · 1 ·.·-- 1 ... - . ... _ . .. _ " 1 v � 0 . .1 ' · .. l  '..4 ..... ..... :::.'...> .. J. . ... • 1... •. \... ,.. • .... • .. 
· · . .  · " l ·'t ' � · �  · ci - · ·" 1 "  t- !  •. , c.. ' · '- e3 . ' L .• � :  .! l : . ; L � \.. 1 l-" . I' 'J :. ' \; .. •J L.. 
astute p o l i  t i c i H n ,  from �:i : t t i cira t i ng the s·�rcnt;th o f  rwwly 
p o l i t i c i z e d  groups on the loft w h o s e  '' t rE ,.., cr-t· h i' r:• r' re ·1 '�I' <i . .' 1 .;. h ._, ,.; • .l •b J - . ., - ... - . • • - "' 
t h e  rj f;c :i. n  l.lrb;.n.i z a t i o n .  J : e  was •:: e l l  av:are th3t .i n o n l c r  
t o  r�:.::i 5. n t n i n  support for h i s  i n d ;...is t r ia l i za t i 0n p o l i c i e s ,  'r y 
t i1 i s  t i 1:-.2 ( 1939 )  >': e l l  cst;� 1:: l i sh c d , h e  ·::o u l d  L:--.·1e t o  h i i  l.d 
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of 1 he cof:'ce grcv.:ers and o t h e r  l �  t i fl) n d i s t a s  be:'ore the 
scheduled e l e c t i c n s .  
S o  Varga s ,  cnce a c c nst i tut i ona l head of st a te then 
a q�asi -fasc ist di c t a t o r ,  would now be c ome a na ti ona l ist­
populist l eader . H e  fo unde d the Bra z i l ian lab or pa r t y ,  
Partido Trabalhi s t a  Bra s il e ro ( ?ID ) ,  bu t w a s  n o t  �bl e to 
form h is base among workers t o  stay in office . I n s t ea d ,  
Enrico Gaspar Dutra ( Varga s '  war minister)  led a �ore 
conservative coal i t i on tc the preside ncy . Dur ing D u t ra s '  
t e rm (1945-1950) , Va rgas c o n t i r: u e d  build ing the P'I·B i n  h i s  
home sta t e  o f  Rio Gra!'lde d o  S u l  wh e r e  h e  m e t  Joao "Jango" 
Gotllart ( later t o  become B r8 z i l s '  las t c ivi l ian presid ent ) . 
The P'l'B ,  bas e d  on govc� rr1rr. E n t  c o n t ro l ]  e d  u n i on s  a.:1d newly 
mobilized urban group s ,  provi ded Va rgas w i th th e S �f rort 
n e e d e d  to reach a n e a r popular �a jori ty f o r  the 1 9 5 0  c l e c t i o� s  
i n  a four-�an rac e .  Back i n  offi ce , Varga s i ntrodu c e d  h i s  
policy of " 7 r-abs l h i sr.:o" whi c h  expand ed 1 )  socia l v:elf� r i s m ;  
2) wcr� i ng - c l a s s  �ol i t ic8 l  a c t i vi sre ; and J )  economi c n&t i on-
a lism . 
By June of 1953 : however,  th e left beGan c a l l i �g for 
even more reform in respcnse to severe droughts a nd h i gh in­
flat ion . P. n t i c i pa t i r:g a need t o  co-o pt me:r:bers o:f h i s  O !-.i.:·, o s -
i t ion, Vargas appo i nt ed G o ulart his n e w  la bc r �i�i s t e r. 
Unfortunately th i s  only s erved to aggra v a t e  the si t u: J t i on as 
G oulart , who openly suppo rte d Fer-on in Argentina a:·.d "" ! :o 
· .. :anted t o  mobi lize :-: i s labcr na s s e s  aga i n s �  t h e  ar::-.y , r c- f:..;. : � c d  
-: o  G d opt a " s e t - t o ug h "  p o l i c:,· ·1.- i t �  s t r � Y. C; rs a r:d c c: ;. t : :-:�t.. d s i...: ;�-
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p o r t i n g  l a rge wage i ncre� s e s  f o r  w 0 r � e r s .  
Under harsh cri t i c i sm from t h e  Uniao Democra t i ca Naci onal 
( UDN ) ,  l e d  by Carl o s  Lacerda , and the mi 1 i tary , G ou l art was 
forced to r e s i g n .  Cri t i c i s m  o f  Vargas by Lacerda ( a  news­
paper publ i s h e r )  and �k e pt i sm o f  the l e ft i s t  o r i e nt a t i on 
o f  Vargas by the n: i l i  t ary c o i � t  inued t o  grow. As a result 
Varga s '  a i d e s  sugge s t e d  t o  Greborio Fortuna t o , a s e mi - l i tera t e  
w h o  wqs ch i ef o f  the pala c e  guard , _ that h e  t�ke care o f  
L a c e r d a .  T h e  ensuing a s sa s inati on a t tempt was unsuc c e s sful 
� i th Lacerda only �ounded but h i s  c ompan i o n ,  an a i r-force 
m a j o r ,  b e i r;g killed . 
A b cusati ons i mmediately materia l i ze d  aga i n s t  Varga s ( who 
was e�en tually ad�on i shed ) and c a l l s  for h i s  r e s igna t i o n  from 
the m i l i tary and o p po s i t i on �ushroo�ed. On hugust 24 , 1 954 
G t  1 .  ,. • t + ' . • ct  e u i o  . arg::is cc:r.r:a l- e a  sln c 1 . e .  
JOAC _"JANCO" GOULART 1 954 -1964 
A s  had been the case s i n c e  19JO,  the m i l i tary s t e pped 
i n  to ir.sure t h e  proper s u c c e s s i o n  �1 f t e r  Vargas ' sui c i d e  and 
p r i o r  to the e l e c t i o n s  of 195 5 .  For � � e  n e x t  t e n  years 
a 1 reacly antagoni sti c re la t i  or.s be tv.-ee:-i : h e  m i  1 i ta ry and 
: c a o  G oulart b e came even wors P .  G cu l � rt w a s  abl e to s ecure 
t h e  v i ce-presid e�cy fer s i x  y e a rs and t h en became Braz i l ' s  
l a s t  civi l ian pre s i d e�t ( 1961-1964 ) .  
By 1964 G ou l 8 rt had b e c 0rr.e the l e a d e r  of the PTB party . 
': h rou�h <'in a l l i ance w i t h  t h e  :: ·a 1 · t i d c  S c c i a l  �e:-:-. O C !'a t i c o  
2 l s o  f ou..-:C. e d  by Var ca s )  a n ::i  t i . c i r  c ::2.::2. i c a  t e  J u s c e l  i !·.o 
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Kubitsch e k , the rrore mod e ra te forces i n  Bra z i l  w e r e  a b l e  to 
k e e p  power from La cerda and t he UDN. Kubitschek promis e d 
" fi fty-years o f  progress i n  five." H i s  rule stim ula t ed a n  
unprecedented expans i o n  o f  indu stry c ha ra ct eriz ed by a great 
influx of foreign capital and expansive eov ernment · ve�tures 
i ncluding t he construction of a new c a p i t a l  c i ty i n  t h e  
h ea rt o f  Bra z i l  ( c a l l ed Bra z i l i a ) . 
A stagnant agricultural sector and h i gh inflat i on f u e l e d  
Jar, i o  QvCJ d ro s  a n o  his " new broom" i n t o  offi c e  with ,  once again, 
G ou l art � s  v i c e-pres � d ent . P r e s i d e n t  Quadros began implement­
ing program s that would have cont ro l l ed both infla t i o n  and 
Brazi l ' s  ba 1 n �ce of r�yffients d e fi c i t ;  however, t h e s e  programs 
a l i enated him p c l i t i ca l l y .  Dome s t i ca l l y ,  Qua dros wanted t o  
r e d u c e  real wag e s  ar:d c � e c k  -:he cor.su:-:ption ha bi t s  of t�e 
rn i � d l e - c l a s s e s  that put him in offi c e .  E e  d e v e l o p e �  e f fi ­
c i t·n cy proerams for the governm ent w:: i ch turned o ut to be 
h i gh ly i n e f f i c i ent . He tightened cred i t ,  �hich m 3 d e  
bu s i r. e ss�ri e n  fear s tagnation. O n  tt:e interna-tional s i de ,  
Qu2 d ros renewed re l ati on s with the co�muni st bloc ; pl edged 
no�-intervent i on in Cuba ; s u pported t�e s e a t i�g of the 
Peopl e ' s F.epubli c o f  C h i n� i n  t h e  U .  f\ . ; ar_d , 2.warded Che 
Guevara the Cr u z e i ro do Sul ( Bra z i l ' high est aNa rd ) .  Con­
sequ ently the military began t o  f e a r  Quadros. I n  Augu�t of 
1961 , seven m o nths after t aking o f fi c e , Quadros re s i gn ed and 
f l e d  t h e  co��try. 
Joao G0ulart,  whc � a s  i n  C h i r a  a t  the t i �e , was forced 
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by t h e  mi 1 i  tary to a c c ept a r a r l .i rx n t � ry type o f  governrr.ent 
w h e re the p re s i d e n t  h e l d  v t-: ry l i t t l e  power before h e  could 
t a ke offi c e .  T h i s  si t�a t i o n  l a s t e d  unt i l  January o f  196J. 
Having pres ented h i mself as a s trong US . a l ly o ppo se d to 
C a s tro and commun i s m ,  Goulart propo s ed a nati onal plebi­
s ci t e ,  ,,,,hi  ch h e  won by a f i  vc - t o - one :1:are; i n ,  t o  g i v e  h i m  
f u l l  presid ential powers . 
�ith t h e  e c �nomy suffering frorn st�;�ati o11 ( the GNP 
fell from ? . ?% i n  1961 to 4 . 5% and 2 . 9% in the foll o :  ..i n,g 
y ea rs ) and i nflat i on o f  1 00� i n  196) , G oulart found h i m s e l f  
i n  a di ffi cul t s i t u a t i o n .  I n  a n  a t t empt t o  conso li dat e  h i s  
ru l e and di sc ourage any i n t ervent i on by t h e  mi li tary ,  G oulart 
concentrated on mobi l i z i n g  �orkers b e h ind h i s  program s .  
BecaGse o f  c ri t i c i sm from the far l e f t  a s  well a s  t h e  e xtre�e 
r i �h t , G o ulart c h o s e  to al i gn h i m s e l f  squarely i n  th e l ef t ­
w i r.g of t h e  ? 1  B p;irty champi oned by h i s  bro t h e r - i !':-law Li c:-:el 
Bri z o l � . 
� i l i t ary i � t e r v � nt i o n  w a s  v i e w e d  v ery cautiously by t h e  
A l  t o  Co:"'l !·:do5 , t � e  army h i c;h cc·:::rr.�nd , for fe2r o f  a ci vi l weir 
expl o d i ng a�o�g G o ulart ' s  urbq� fo l l o�e rs .  �o one was quit e 
sure a s  t o  how strongly worke r s ,  who were se riously hurt 
by infl8 t i o n ,  s upported Goul art . 
Ey �arch o f  1964 G oulart was ma� ing a seri o�s b i d  to 
s e c ure s u � po r t  for h i s  c i v i l i a n  regine from t � e  rank and fi l e  
of t !: e  m i l i tary . S ut;gesti ons that rr:i l i  ta ry persor:nel b e  
B i v en t � e  r i E h t  t o  vo te j n  �at i onal e le c t i o� s  as w e l l  a s  f o r� 
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jover·nment un i ons l ed forty m c r::bers of the navy to tt·y and 
form a union. Upon their a rrest by officers 1 , 000 sai lors 
mutinied . later G oulart granted the forty a complete p�rdon 
stating : 
No one d esires more than I the g l o ry of 
our navy • • •  but discipline i s  not founded 
on hate and inequalities . Discipline i s  
fot;nded on mutual respect between those 
who command and those who are c ommand e d .  
( Tulli s ,  197J : 1 J O ) 
Three days later, during a banquet COQ�emorating the 
pardons, the four Sratilian a rmies6 m�rched on Rio de J2n e i ro . 
Goulart f l ed to Brazilia and then home to Rio G rande d o  S u l .  
Finding no support he left for U ruguay on Apri l 4 , 1964 . 
Goulart ' s  political adversa ries , espec i a l ly Carlos 
Lacerd a ,  were exub erant .  They viewed the M i litary seizure 
of ro\';er ( a s  many in the mi lita ry d i d )  a s  a t r-:'·:1 or;. ry rr:e-:.. ::; u re 
d e signed to oversee the transfer of po·•:e r  t o  a new le;'?.d e r-
h ope�uJ.ly �acerda and his UDN pa rty . This was net to be the 
c a s e .  hs hi storically unprecedented as it wa s ,  the milita ry 
d id not a l low civili�ns b a c k  in pow e r .  Brazil �tablished a 
new trEnd of Milit ary rule by dictatorship that has repeated 
itse l f  throughout I_atin .L.rr.eri c a .  I n  Bra z i l the military 
regime has survived seventeen ye� �s a nd i s  l i kely to continue 
at le�st until the term of President ? i gu e i rdo ends in 198 5 .  
After that time indirect prcsidentiai elections including 
civilian candida t e s  a re s c h eduled to ce h e l d .  
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M I LITARY D I CTATOR S H I P  1964-1� 80 
T h e  mi l ita ry po l i ti c ians foCT!'led a gove rnment on ;\ pril 
1 1 .  1964, against the w i shes of many m od e rate of f i c e r s  who 
favored an immedia t e  r eturn to civili a n  rul e . They d i d  s o  
w i t h  the r. e l p  of G e n e ral Cast ello Branco who be cur.1 e the " swing 
man" i n  the revo l u t i o n .  
M i l i tary pre s i Jent s i n  Bra z il have h a d  a lm o s t  a u t o c r a t i c  
power s .  They have u sed Insti tuti onal A c t s  to bypass c ons ti­
tuti onal l i mi t s , i s su i ng twelve a cts since 1964. The fi rst 
three combined to 1 )  expand presidential power s ,  suspend 
indiv1dual const i t u t i onal r i ghts and d e c l are na t i onal emergen­
ci e s ; 2) reduce t h e  pow�rs of Con�rc s s ;  J )  expand the func tions 
and powers of m i l i tary tr ibuna l s  over c i v i l i a n  courts ; 4 )  e l -
iminate a l l p o l i t i cal parti e s  3�d est a b l ish a t w o - p�rty 
s y s t em- the o p po s i t i on MDB �rty and the mi l itary hR��A party 
(the part i e s  of " y e s  and yes sir! " ) :  5) sel�ction of prc s ­
i d e n t, s ,  ' i c e - p re s i d e n t s  and sta te governors through i nd i re ct 
e l e c t i on s :  and , 6 )  r e s t ri ct i o n  of the cand i dat e s permi t t e d  
to run f o r  Con�re s s .  ( Ronn i n e ,  1966 : 298-299 ) 
T h e  fifth a c t , i s � ued in D e c e�ber of 1968 , wa s the mo st 
repre s s i ve - r e ces s i ng congre s s ,  suspending habeas cor pu s ,  
a rre s t i ng �nd susrend i ng po li t i ca l rights of hundreds �nd the 
i � p o sition � full s t a t e  censor ship of the pre s s .  The act 
prove d ,  ho�eve r ,  not to e�d opro s i t i cn but to cha�nel i t  
throuGh urban t e �rori s �  erou p s .  Fro� 1968-1972 urt�n 
l��err i l l s s  k i d na ; p e: d  :io th t h e  M;.erl c;�;i and Sw i s s  
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Some say t h i s  c�used G e n e ra l  Costa e S i lva ( pre s i d ent , 1967-
1969)  t o  suffer a bra i n  hemorrhage . He wa s replaced by 
G en e ra l  Garra s t u z u  � e d i c i  ( 1969-1974 ) . M ed i ci pursued 
t e rrori sts rel e n t l e s sly a n d  caused a slow down in thei r a c t i -
vi t i e s  by t h e  early 1 970 ' s . 
j h e  i ncrea s e  i n  arre s t s ,  tortures and even �urders by 
pc l i c e  and ri�ht wing d e a th squad s ,  plus t h e  f i f th i ns t i ­
t u t i onal � c t  i t s elf l ed A l ve s  ( 1972 : 55 ) ,  a former congressman 
and opronent of the regime
7
, to s t a t e  that 2 ra z i l  had become 
a full-fledged t e r rcri s t  s t a t e .  
� i th t h e  �nd of � e d i c i ' s  term came t h e  end o f  a six year 
( 1968-1974 ) econom i c  boom in 3 ra z i l .  During t h i s  peri od 
Bra z i l  experienc ed more t h n il  a 1 0% per year grov1th rat e .  Und e r  
t h e  guidance o f  planning m i ni s t e r  J e l f i n  1 : e t t o ,  a c i vi l ian , 
the period becane kno·.,m a s  tt:e "5rr-i z i l i c.n h: i :ra c l e . "  The 
�i ra c l e ,  howeve r , had a negative effect on t h e  p l i �h t  o f  the 
workers , whose real wages d e c l i ned and on the peasant s ,  
e s pe c i a l ly those i n  t h e  Northeast where l iving c o nd i t i on s  are 
among the worst i n  the wo rld . hs a matter of fact the real 
m i racle wa . ·  how a cotmt r:,• c o u l d  e x j  e r i e n c e  such i n�pres sive 
rat e s  o:' grcwth and sti l l  come out w i th an even h i 5her con-
c e n t ra t i on of wea l th for the top J . 5% of the popu l a t i on than 
before ( from 25% of the na t i onal i ncome in 1960 to 3J% i n  
1970 ) .  
�hen Ge�era l  G e i s e l , � e d i c i ' s  s u c c e s s o r ,  t o o k  o f f i c e  
( 1974 -1979 ) h e  }·. oped t o  s'.T:ba rk e n  �� r·:l i c y  of " d e compres :::: i o n . "  
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'fh i s  was supposed to be a trend t o \·:ard po l i t i ca l  l i bcral­
i a t i o n .  W i th t h e  e c onomy falt e ring . h o w e v e r .  oppo s i t i on t o  
the regime grew and President G e i se l  reac t e d  i n  t h e  typi cal 
fashion o f  h i s  pre d e c e s s o r s .  I n  hpri l o f  1977 G e i s el c l os e d  
t h e  coneress a n d  ruled by d e c re e .  H e  q u i c k l y  i n i t i a t e d  t h e  
" l ei f a l c o "  whi ch banned a l l  pol i t i ca l  adverti seir:en t s ,  i n ­
c l uding publ i c  servi c e  announcement s .  H e  a l s o  pro v i d e d  for 
the i nd i re c t  e l e c ti on of one-th i rd the s e n a t e  i n  �he 1978 
e l e c t i o n .  1 h i s  was e specially u s eful f o r  g e t t i n g  G e i s e l ' s  
hand pi cked s uc c e s s o r .  G eneral F i guei red o ,  e l e c t e d  f o r  h i s  
t e rm star t i ng i n  1 9 7 9 .  The "J\ pri l package'* thwarted G e i se l ' s  
h o p e s  fo� l i beral i za t i o n  j u s t  a s  t h e  f i f t h  I n s t i t ut i onal Act 
ended Costa e S i lva ' s  pro;:i i s e  t o  " l': ur-1 ein i z e the revol u t i on . "  
Under t h e  regime o f  Pres i d e n t  � i gue i r d o ,  c a l l s  f o r  
l i b e ra l i za t i on have resurfaced . f i gue i rd o  h a s  proposed h i s  
o-..,•n plr.i.n c a l l e d  " a bertura" ( m e a n i ng l i erta l ly t o  open ) . 
? i gu e i !"ed o '  s plan pre c i pi ta t e d  four events that must be tc-!t: e n  
i n to cons i d e ra t i on when ana lyz i ng t h e  present s i t ua t i on i n  
Bra z i l .  A ccording to D a s s i n  ( 1 97 9 : 35 )  t h o s e  are 1 ) the gcv­
ernrr, e n t !5  amnesty program that a l  l ow s  former po l i t i ca l  exi l e s  
( ca s s o d o s ) t o  return a n d  re s t ore t h e i r  po l i t i ca l  r i gh t s  w h i ch 
had been suspend e d ; 2 )  reform o f  the el ectoral calendar t o  
i nc l u d e  c i v i l i ans i n  e l e c t i on s  f o r  gove rnorshi p s  a�d t�e i n­
d i re c t  e l e c t i o n  o f  the pre s i d e n t ; J )  forma t i on o f  new part i e s  
thus abol i sh i ng th e i n st i tu t i on � l  a c t  m a k i ng a l l  part i e s ,  
� x cept for A RENA and K93 , i l l cc� l ;  an1 , 4 )  C o n d re s s i onal 
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a pproval o f  a plan to revoke l P c i sl� i t i o n  prohibi t ing s tudent 
pol i ti cal a c t i v i t y ,  ��ich has led to reorgan i zat i on of the 
po�erful Nati onal Student Union ( UNE ) .  
I t  is Ficueiredo ' s  hope that these moves toward abertura ' . 
w i l l  be looked upon a s  true de�ocrat i z a t i on ,  and that i t  wi l l  
help fragment government opposition.  Pang ( 1 981 1 58 )  notes 
that tl i e  government w i l l  not tolerate oppo s i tion to abert ura , 
"which has proved to be a better weapon than any right­
wing repre ssive measures for fragrr.enting the opposition . .. S 
This chapter r.a s  attempted t o  achi eve two goa l s . F irst , 
i t  has d e scrj bed the na t i ona l i st-popu l i s t  movement whi ch dom­
inated the political  dev..: lop:-nent of B ra z i l  from 1930-1964. 
Second , it has exar:: i�:ed the 1:; i l i  tary-8.uthori tarian po l i t i c a l  
force which replaced popu l i sm a fter 1964. .�n understar,c'ling 
o f  these  movements �ay h e lp to provide insi6h t  into t�e 
conditions of dependence  i n  Bra z i l .  
1 
FOOTNOTES- CHhPTER I I  
A " Pauli s ta " was one from S a o  Paul o .  T h e  state where the 
most powerful coffee growers were ba s ed . 
2 Th e 11 t er�cnt es" rr.ovement , eventual l y  a co:-:-!rnuni s t  l e d  move­
ment ,  consi ste d of three ma j o r  planks . T enentes were interest­
ed in 1 )  m i dd l e - c l a s s  part i ci pat i o n  i n  the pol i t i ca l sy s t em ; 
2 )  a strong federa l  apparatus t o  d e a l  wi th the rea l i t i e s  o f  
t h e  " social que s t i on" ( A rendt ' s ,  196 5 ,  phrase for r.: u s s i ve 
poverty ) :  and , J )  an a t tack o n  t h e  domi nant position o f  
foreign capi ta l in the e c o n omy . ( D o s  Santos , 1974:439) 
J The Estado Novo consi s t e d  of programs to build B ra z i lian 
industry, control l ed worker part i c i pa t i o n  ( through government 
sponsored labor unions ) , and a gove rDnen t social s e curity 
program for workers thus increas i ng urbanization and Varga s '  
po l i t i cal bas e .  I t  also contai ned proc; rurr: s  d e s igned t o  d i s ­
p l a c e  the power o f  the agri cul tural o l igarchy by urbani z i ng 
publ i c  admi�i strat i on and el i mi na t i ng ,  to some d e Jre e ,  
c l i entel rela t i onships.  
I� 
A la tifund i a i s  a large planta t i on-l i ke form i n  S o u � h  
Ameri ca.  
5 
The Alto Comando i s  the h igh conmand of t h e  B ra z i l i a n  � i l -
i iary . G enerals re t i re and a re repla ced by today ' s  m ) l i tary 
pre s i dent after twelve years of s e rv i c e .  President F i gu e i redo 
has the unusua l  opportunity to repla ce a l l  o f  tt:e high com­
r.:and by Hoven:ber,  1 981 . ( Pang, 1981 : 5 9 )  
6 Bra z i l  h a s four separate a r� i e s a l l  l ed by d i fferent gen­
e ra l s  �hich gives them considerable i nfl u ence over controver­
s i e s  that � igh t occur i n si de the governmer: t . 
7 �h i le in Con3ress , A lves urged that c i t i zens boyc o t t  the 
Sept ��ber 7 ,  1968 i n� e p e ndence day pa ra de a n d  that Bra z i l ian 
wor.ien not " s o c i a l i z e "  w i th r.;en i n  mi l i t c..iry uniform. The out­
rage i n  the 80Vern:u·!"lt l ed t o  the fi fth I �1 s t i  tuti ona l A c t  i n  
Dece�ber, 1 968 a fte r  which nine ty-three cc��ress�en from both 
houses ( Federal depu t i e s  2nd S enators ) were denied their 
seats . ( Rosenbaum , 1970 : 74 - 7 5 )  
8 O n  f!'acmentation o f  th e oppo s i t i c n ,  P:::.r.g ( 1981 : 58 )  not es 
th�t th�re a r e  today s i x  d i fferent p o l i t i ca l  p� rt i es i n  2ra � i l .  
Those are the pro-e;overnment s o c i a l  d emocratic party ( PDS) 
a n d  Popular Party ( PP- �ade up o f  banke r s . profe s si onals and 
i ndustrial i s t s ) .  The o l d  MDB i s  now the p;.:DB ( Party o f  the 
Br2 z i l ian Democra t i c  Movement ) . The Vargas and G o u l a r t  
workers part ( PTB ) is now under t h e  l ea d ership of I ve t e  Vargas 
with Leonel Brizola s p l it ting off to form the PDT ( T h e  Dem-
- ocratic Worke�s Pa rty) and final l y ,  the Worker ' s  Party ( PT ) .  
CHAPTER I I I  
'fHE EXPOP.T ECONOi1�Y AND I r·1PORT SUBSTI'l'UTI ON 
1822-1964 
I l I . 
rtnd i ndns Lria l i s t s .  T h i s  chr-i. p t e r  w i l l  ex:J.m:i.ne l 1,·,10 rcJ r i od s  o f  
c l a : J s i c a l  d c p1;nd e n c e  i n  Br:J .i: i l .  '.I'h e  f i rs t ,  t h e  c,l.'1)".·1t.h o f  ! h e 
e xport e c o �10·:1y ( 1 8 2 2 - 1930 ) ,  encompa s s e s  a stage i n  '"h i ch 
:::i.� r· i c u l  t u !°·ri 1 i :_: t s  c n jo�« J d  h igh profi t s  from the export of t h e i r  
l" ' "'  1 1  · · C f ·. ·= l' '(' J. " l 1 y " ) i·' r r' c ) ,a, (, l. ( \..: , � l, ,,. )\.: . . <.1 • '-I . .. • !� c�1�.l 1 enc;c . to t h i s  t'ra d i t i or:al 
a l l iar:c e " ) , \·:;-,, s able t o  d i s plc.1ce U 1 e  u.1.ll e l l. Le • � r:1i i :1 i !  � :.; i:c 
Era z. i l ' s  drive towards i ndus t rial i za t i o n .  
'l'h c  p e r i od o f  i'U t ward grov; t h  w i th i n  th e h i s to r i cal-
�: t..cuc tu r;:i. l :.: nalysi s o f  t � e  d .: c c :  d e  nee ::; :::iuro: .r:h ·u:i.s ch·.  r:ictcri z e d , 4 - • 
p e n d e n t  on pri :nn ry (•xports. .= n  13r:::i. z i l  th i s  p e r i o d  l u s t e d  
j u s t  o v e r  0 ! 1 e - h und � ·ed y e a rs fro:n i nd e pcnde:ncc i n  1822 t o  t h e  
G reat I:'epr8 s s i on ( 1 930 ) .  B y  t h e  ri. i dd l e  of the n i ne t c o n th c e n -
t u ry t�e Brn z i l i a n  c c onc�y w a s  h e a v i l y  d e pendent o n  J he i n-
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of t h e  Br i t i sh up through t h e  F i r s t  �orld War. Indeed , 
Great B r i t a i n ,  the m o s t  po\'; e 1·ful c e n t e r  pol ity i n  the world ­
e c onomy du ri ng the n:� :1e t e l�n th century , ov.-r,ed a l l  the i m port/ 
export houses that su pervl scd the coff e e  mar k e t .  The Bri t i sh 
a l s o  su ppli ed B ra z i l i an s  wi th a substant i a l  po rtion of the 
�anufn� tured �oods they required .  
I n  the la t t er part o f  the ni ne t e enth century coffee in­
come caused r e a l  per capi ta incomes to r i s e  a t  a faster rate 
in B ra z i l  than the increase in Uni t ed Stat e s '  per capita 
i nc o m e s  d u r i ng t h e  saffie period ( Furtado , 1965i l6J-164). B e ­
cause 3 ra z i  l i ans C·\';r;e d  1:.any of t h e  plantat i on s ,  much of the 
profits f o u nd their way ba c k  into the cou�try. W i th two­
t h i rd s  of Ernzil ' s  agri c u l t i.lral proJ u c t  be i ng exported from 
1889-191 3 ,  over half o f  v;h i ch w� s c o ffee 1 , t h i s  method of 
ra i s i ng capi tal appeared t o  be t h e  best \';r::..y t o  i:r.prove 
Braz i l ' s  standing i n  the wo rld- e c ono�y . 
T h e  coff e e  boom of this period was gr eatly influenced 
by Great Bri t a i n  i n  three crucial way s .  F i rst , t h e i r  li ber a l  
i nf ] u c: n c e  o n  Braz ilian s o c i e ty pr e c i p i t a ted the a bo l i ti o n  of 
slavery , wh i ch was t e cc�ing too e xp c � s i v e  and who s e  end 
freed capi t al t h a t  c o u l d  now be used to �eve l o p  infra stru c­
ture �or e  thorouBhly ( � o s  Sant o s ,  1974 : 42 4 ) . A l so , the 
f ounding of the repibl i c  i n  1889 helped to moderni z e the 
p o l i ti cal supers truc tur e and a s s im i l � t e  i t  to the needs of 
t h e  agrarian export ol i gar chy ( Eva n s ,  197 6 s J1 ) .  Fina l ly , 
w i th t h e  h e l p  o f  c2 pi ta l &va ilable a � t e r  t h e  abol i t i o� cf 
s l avc:ry and :i nc rc-;:. s i!:g c o :' .f c e  d c :::::! n c s  ( cxi='orts r,ccw frc:n 5 , 5  
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m i l l ion baes i n  1890 to 15 mill i o n  by 1901 - Furtado , 1965 1 
1 93 - 1 94 )  the British " provided financj ng and railroads to 
d E: v e l o p  the coff e e  trad e "  ( Ga l l ,  1 977 : '+6 ) .  Ov e r  sixty-six 
p� rcent of British investment in Brazil went to railroad 
construct i o n  to move coff e e  to the co a st . From 1870 to 191 5 
Brazil ' s  railway system went from 750 k i l ometers to 25 , 000 
kilom e t er s  ( Evans , 1976 a J4 ) .  
Brazil ' s  d e pendence o n  the inte rnational p r i c e  of c o ff e e  
became cle a r  when the United Stat e s  experienced a n  e conomic 
c r i s i s  in 1890 that s e nt the price of coffe e  down from four 
pounds sterling to less than one -and-one half pounds sterling 
per bag ( Do s  Santos , 1974 : 432 ) Fortunately demand continued 
to i nc r e a s e  thus preserv i ng the i nflow of capi tal . As Evans 
( 1 976s J2 ) noted 
R e a l  crisis for the d e pendent cccno�y 
r equi red fall i ng prices c ombined wi th a 
s tagnant market , whi c h  is \':hat •.-1as i n  
store for Bra z i l  i n  ·i:he thirti es . 
As th e Bra zilian e conomy continued to expand through the 
e x po rt of agricultural goo d s , there develo p e d  what Dos Santos 
( 1 974 : 4 25 ) calle d  a " coff e e  r:io noculture . "  'The c o n c e ntration 
of income i n  a v e ry small homogeneous group of large land 
o ·.·;ners (latifundistas ) led to the form2tion of an agrarian-
e xpo rt o ].iei-irchy who s e  " i deological and political for c e  • • •  
rr.ade i t  • . •  a veritable busine s s , intell e ctua l ,  political elite 
capable of overcoming all o ppositio n to its dominatio n . "  This 
do�ina t i o n  was demonstrated i n  t h e  1906 Taubate Agree�ent 
wh i ch co�pelled the s tate to f i x  the price of co f fe e ,  buy 
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surplus rind thus c on t r o l  supply. 
Th i s  extreme dependence o f  the economy on coffee a l s o  
meant tha t Bra z i l  h a d  fa i le d  to deve l o p ,  w i t h  t h e  pa r t i a l  ex-
c e p t i on o f  infra s t ructur e ,  other sectors o f  the economy. I n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  having to import c e r t a i n  food s t uff s ,  Bra z i l ' s  
imports of i n d u s t r i a l  goods from B r i t a i n  alone had grown 
from si xteen m i l l i on pounds sterling i n  1850 to forty m i l l i on 
by 1900. I n d e e d , d ependence on export a ti o n  o f  one commodity 
and import a t i on o f  a w i d e  variety o f  products i s  the m o s t  con­
s p i cuous and dangerous character i s t i c  o f  the export-led 
e conomy. 
The " r e a l  cri s i s" of the export - l e d  e c onomy came w i th the 
depress ion i n  19)0. �h i l e Braz i l  earned 100 m i l l i o n  pounds 
t i · f ff l • 1 9"8 . t d 1 t '  . t s _ e r  ing ro!Tl co ee expo r � s  1 n  _ ._ ,  i earnc o;-i y .n1 r y-
f1·cm 4u5 . 9  .... i l J i cn d o l l a r s  i n  1929 t o  180 . 6  m i l l ion d o l l �rs 
1. n l c J 2 r =-, ,, .... ·' � o 1c7  o · 1 1  u ' / \ • ...c. - I. • "' \..l • ; • . , • T h i s  v:as er.used not c : · l y  by a 
s i x ty perce:it d rop i n  t h e  pri c e  o f  coffe e i n  : : c w  ·i o r lc  f.:'c:n 
1929-1931 , but a l s o  a s  a r e s u l t  of a s ta�nant ::;arke: t ·.-:!I i ch 
included �a�y new �rod u c e r s . 
� i th t h e  coffib incd l o s s  o f  a substant i a l  portion o f  h e r  
export revenues and impor t i ng capacity ( al s o  caused i n  part 
by the strain on goverrtment spending due to t h e  Taubate 
Agreement ) Era z i l  was t h r u s t  into a new stage o f  d e v e lopmen t .  
Under t � e  t � t e l �g e  o f  G e t u i l o  Vargas and h i s  l i beral a l l iance 
duri ng the period of illiport substi tu tion . 
Ifl1PORT S Y.BST I TUTI ON I NDU STRIALIZATI ON_l 93-0-1964 
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Protectionist poli c i e s  l i ke the Taubate Agreement as 
well  as the sudden l os s  of export revenues caused i�flation 
to ri s e  precipi tously in the 19JO ' s . The buying of coffee 
surplus a l s o  led t o  a devaluation o f  the currency and an in­
crea s e  in the foreign d ebt (Futado , 1970 : 1 1 4 ) . The result of 
these cri se s  were condi t i ons unde r wh i c h  nati onal i ndustry 
could expand . Because imports had risen so h i gh i t  was now 
financia l ly feasible for l o ca l  industriali s t s  to produce 
substitut e s .  Poli t i ca l ly i t  a l s o  meant that the agrarian-
export o l i g2rchy would now face a strong chall enge from lead-
e rs o f  an ur L�.!1 1� 0 1  i t i c::il 1·.ovc:-: c:: nt und e r  tJ-ie h eading of 
The rapid c xp;o.r:sion o f  �.2 n1  · : c t. u :r' i. r:� , 
t ot�ether v:ith the c c · ::- ·. (�: · .:. : .  ::.<_q�e ; r.­
t ernal m i c,ra t i on frc:r. -"'�:c cc-.J �-. t i��· side: t o  
t }  . t • . d i4 "' 'I-- t + . 1 f' ·. e  c1 i e s ,  prov1 e ""  l • .  e po C.:1 � 1 :.3  _ o r 
an urban based pol i t i c a l  move�cnt t o  ccffie 
to -:1ower . Under the tannur o f  c.utono:::ous 
d e v� l o ��ent and the subord i na t i on o f  
c l a s s  l r. t c re s t s  to t h e  s t a t e  • . •  both ( cap­
i la l i s t s  c.i:d \\Orke rs ) sought import con­
trols and exchange ra t e s  that gave t h e i r  
i r.terests priority over the expert s e c t o r .  
from 1929-1937 B ra z i l  saw i ts indus trial production grow 
f i fty percent whi l e  imports d e c l ined twenty-three percent . 
� n t e rnational econo�ic conditions that made import �uts titution 
. i ndustrial i za ti on ( I  S I ) po ssible alert_ w i th governme!'1ta1 dev-
e : o :;:: :: c n t  r:o l i c i e s  ( c:� sy cred i t  2 n r:l  fore j gn e x r:hnnce su!:'·sid:. � s )  
s � i rr.ulatcd ".. he nat i onal e cor�un:y with 7 - 1 1 /� annual r;:-c-.· . .._ h  ra t e; s  
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from 1 �40 t o  1961 . ( Furtado ,  1970: 1 1 5 ,  129- l J O )  
T h i s  peri o d  o f  import subs t i tu t i on a l s o  marked a shift 
' 
i n  B ra z i l ' s  r e l a t i o n s  wi th the center n a t i or.- sta t e s .  Spe-
c i f i ca l l y , the Uni t e d  States would become Bra z i l ' s  biggest 
trading pa r t n e r  and biggest foreign i nv e s t o r .  The Bri t i sh 
had i nv e s t e d  heavily i n  the export agri cul tural s e c t o r s .  
�he U n i t e d  S t at e s ,  u n l i k e  i t s  s i tu a t i on i n  much o f  La t i n  
l m e r i ca , h a d  n o t  and was therefore w i l l i ng t o  encourage in­
dus tria l i za t i o n  ( a s  e v i d enced by increasing U . S .  i nve stment 
in ��r.ufa c t u r i ng- table 1 ) .  
1_�.BJ.JL!_: D i r e c t  Private I nvestrr.ent in Bra z i l ,  1929-78 
( U n i t ed S t a t e s  I nvestment ) 
�.:anu fa c t u r i ng 
f.�RnU- a S !'t re E::l)tage 
Y e H r  � o t a l  fn c t � r i �E of T o t a l  
1929· ----- 1 94__ __ _ ··- 46 --- - - -·--- 2-ij�� --- - --
1940 240 70 29% 
1946 J2J 1 2 5  39% 
1 950 644 285 4 4% 
1 957 8J5 378 457� 
1 961 1 , 000 54J 54% 
1 964 994 67J 68% 
1 967 1 , 32 6  891 67% 
1972 2 , 490 1 , 745 70% 
1 974 J , 760 2 , 578 68% 
1977 5 , 95 6  J , 935 66% 
1978 7 , 1 70 4 , 684 65% 
S o urc e :  Hewl e t t ,  1940 : 228 
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t ing to note that Uni t ed States invedt�ents in 
Bra z i l  res�mble i t s  investments in Europe much more than t h o s e  
i n  the r e s t  of :,a tin J..rr. e rica . ( Table 2 )  
'I' f, BLE 2 
S e ctoral Shifts in U . S .  Direct Ir.vestment : 1929-1973 
1 929 - ... . .Lia -. i n  
1950 - + .  .ua "in 
Europe America Brazil Europe America Brazil 
Extr:J.ctivc and 
" ) . . ; r i rr..1ry 
( mini r.r;. pctrol­
cun n nd agrgri cul­
turc ) 
. r.1anufacturir.G 
Comm c :- c c , S ervice 
nnJ O ther 
( i n c l u d e s  tr:i d c ,  
publ i c  utili ties 
and o ther) 
'.i'C'r/i1 
1 7% 61% 
47% 7% 
36% 32% 
1 00% 1 00% 
12% 26% 5J% 1 ?� 
24% 54% 1 8% 44% 
64% 20% 29% 39% 
1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 1 00% 
" 
1 973 
:l.C! t� n 
Europe America Brazil 
23% 35% 12% 
56% J5% 69% 
21% JO% 19% 
1 0 0%  1 00% 1 00% 
( 1 , J5 J ) * ( 3 ,519) ( 194) ( l , 7JJ ) ( 4/+45 ) (644) {37, 21 8 )  ( 1 8/+52) ( 3 , 1 99)  
*Figures in parentheses are totals in millions of U . S .  dolloars . 




�he e x t raord inary contra c t i on o f  the interna ti onal 
market during the Great Depre s s i o n  and d o m e s t i c  i nfla t i o n  
which severely constri c t e d  Brazi l ' s  impo r t i ng capa c i ty made 
the process of subs t i tut ing l o c a l l y  manufactured pro d u c t s  
for imports h i ghly conduc i ve t o  the i n i t i a l  hori z o n t a l  ex­
pansion of i ndustry ( a s i tuu ti on where growth i s  a ch i e ved a s  
unemployment i ncrea s e s  y e t  indi vidual produc t i v i ty stagr.a t e s  
a s  a result of prim i t ive technology ) . Eowever, as �a l lc rs t e i n  
( 1 980 : 8 )  points o u t , ! S I  i s  only fre e from export earnings 
during t h i s  first stage o f  expans i o n .  When hori zonta l ex­
pan s i on ,  wh i ch increases overa l l  growth but not prod u c t i v i t y ,  
i s  exhausted , the economy c a n  only continue i t s  growth by 
i ntegrating i t s  i n d u s t ry v e r t i c a l l y  ( that i s .  by i mproving 
produ c t i v i t y  through b e t t e r  management ar.d �ore adva n c e d  
t e chnology ) . B e cause the i n t i t i a l  stage of ISI i n  D ra z i l  
r e l i e d  heavily on d o m e s t i c a l ly a va i lable reanagement and 
t e chnology , more a dvanced forms had to be import e d .  Thus 
Brazi l ' s  importing c a pa c i ty had to be increased e i th e r  by ex­
panding the vol��e of exports ( whi c h  was d i f fi c u l t  s i nc e  man­
ufactured B ra z i l i a n  goods were e c onomi c a l ly non-compe t i t i ve 
i n t crna ti o�ally- i . e .  the pri c e s  were too high ) o r .  the 
me thod ado � ted by c i v i l i a n  l eaders such a s  K u b i t s c h e c k  ( 1955-
1960 ) by finan c i n5 imports "on the oa s i s  of an i nc re a s e d  
e x ternal d e b t  and further r e l i ance on foreign i nvestment • . •  
t h e  sui c i d e  of Vargas ( 1954) symbo l i z e d  the end o f  th i s  easy 
peri od o f  i Ii.i)Ort ��'.l b s t i  t u  ti o n . " ( Valenzuela and Valenzue la , 
e d in t · �.: J a J • 
1rf.. BT:E � . ·---·-·· .. ..  L 
.�§.r�,.Y .. (Sl 
Growth i s  i. liTO\i,:h : , ,_,t .! " ' t; �: ­
tal c x p·:)1s i o n  of <1 l 1 c:· · ly 
e .x i st j ng loc:.:i l  j nd l > � l. c i. o s  
·_,, h i c h  } i : ; d  p1·c v i  0 1  >.s ly 
only r; qpfll i cd a f ra c t ion 
of i"hc ·�o:;i c s t i c  rr!;u·Jrn t ,  
c: � pecia 1 ly cc.::sti; : G .C  non­
d u ra bl 1; s .  
;rh e  inn.n !3 tr i a l  s e c t o r  i s  
characteri z e d  by n prim-
a ti ve l evel o f  il'�hnol­
oey. T"• 1 l 1 :i.�1r;e r ' c :5 t s  a r e  
J ov1 lK 1_· 1!_; · �e c f  ; -�1: c•:�!1cntal 
( ' ''· r- 1'"' i . . ' ., . . . .  � \, 1 , ·, ·  " !  .. <h l ' . - . \,,; .. -· ;,, "' . . ' • -
; i-: f"· !. L =-1 . -: ; � , :� · .. ·, � ·. 1 · ._, ! : t ;i_ S 
la1·o:c i.: . •Jd'J1.: L i v i  : y  :.; '. ·:t;­
na t c s .  
Produ c t  .i.on i s  :-i. i:·.od ;1 t 
the low- i nc c:1�i e  !.1.:n· k e t .  
H o nc e ,  dL>.r:ar�d i s  d c 1. 01 :u e: n t  
upon t h e;  spc�:d ) J1g o f  the 
popular cla::: :�0 s .  
� h e r e  i s  d e c l i n i ng par­
t i c i pa t  1. 0n of f o r e i gn 
ca p i  ta l i n  t:�:c n?. t j  cn::?l 
C: C ')!1:J::iy 
; ') 
T · · � P.  T S I  
r :  ' .... !. h i s  L11l.'Ol1t,h 0:c c 1  i. .:·;Jl 
· . ; · - : . i , . n  i :: :  o p·,· ... L t c i  n6 
'� , i ,· 1 ' I. � 1 p ; J. 0 ; • • •  I . • .. � �  i I .... ' .. ' ... . ' . � \,, 
j , . ; ,  · 1. i l i .. t c  ·, :: d 1.:: ��i. 1.;� l 
t_, • '- ) l�.i :"' :_; '. •t� J�  l ,'' � : I :  t' i 1� c� �­
t :1 l : �- l � ! : • i 11 n \. i • '. n , · ._. r. .• 
:... ,; . _L l,.. c�· 1 :.;· ) (' !3 • 
The indu s Lrial s e c t o r  i s  
cha ra c t e r i z e d  by an advanc­
ed l e ve l  of te chnology , 
h C; n c e , large rcq u i l'r!1� � n t s  
o f  c u  pi t a l  and CXf-L'l't i s e .  
Fntrance c-os t s  <U ; h 1 ,..,h . 
1 " 1  , , ·, ·c i - �  · · , ·c · t l1 : : . . . 1 1 . - J1 i "' ·-, L · • > l ,  •' • • • 1 ' t. 
t_.: l,. '-I:' .. � ; \ ' "� 1 ' � i l' � f l \ '  � t l I.: � � 'l i t y 
0 !3 l " f1 l L J < I l t !-j l . _, I ! : l 8 8 • 
! .... L"·c.c!i.; c i. � c· �  i s  :1 � 1 ·:ud 
. 1  i c..h - .i l : •...:G1,-.e ::1a:cke t .  
1.i1:� ·!:::.nd i s  d e  pendent 
the spend i ng of the 
c l a s s e s .  
a t  :..h e  
H c r� c e , 
o n  
upper 
There i s  i nc rc;;;, �:; 1 :"'t; p'l r ­
t i cipa t i o;i , e v i:: n p:ce­
dominan c e ,  of for c i en 
ca pi ta l i �  the rw. tio:1al 
e cor.or.;y . 
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r(! \ 'k c ul i . .  , i.-"h' � i ;�g c;:•r"u · i.. ty \"''J S responsible f o r  i nc 1·<:-::: s i ngly 
e s :.:.: c i 1 t i. � 1 l j ;" .:..· 1.0 1· i.:.'. !. i 1-. 1 � !> •) f 1: c. c h noJ ogy , <:H p i t a l _ and ore,r-u1i z a t i o n  
. ' . . 1. n e  , 1 :1 
dency for a d ec l i n i nf� r.-ite of e,1·ow th . 11 ( ' " "' 1 1 ( ' ' (' • · '- c J· n J08 0 · 9 ) ft 1:,.. . . Jo .. J Li , • • - ./ • 
:;;1i s s tudy r.c w  s h i ft s  t o  factors con tri butj ng t o  both 
the r..nd o f  �.h e  t'l':l of I S I  r·: nd the bcGinn i ng· of n e w  dcpcnrien cy·-
( C8rdoso,  19? J )  
, . .  ,[, J : ' "' '  l ' " < /} ' '  ' .. • / , I I • t' \... -
I t  has been prc.. p::• s e d  tha t IS� was s t j ::-.tda tui by : he 
G �'l"�l t 7: 1  r n') s s i on .  The r c : rn l t j.ng infJ a t i o n  8.nd .lo s s  t)f l' . A P•.' L't 
• .i l · ' � ' · ' ' 1 · ' n ' l  t I S T  2 ' ;-i p l  ,Jl.. i � 1 -. J v :t10u C !:.1:1n i . -:. 0 1 1 s  c.:· 0 1 �1.. u.ci ve in .u ra z i  · o . , • 
<· t ·� -. u f  r· 1 1 · 0 ·• ·' 11 � : • ]  ·� ' "' U t,_; . 1 '. - ... " • ' J  .. .  ,,. there appeared a 
under the l:cr=. d i n�s o f  ::·� t i c nn U  s t  d c v c l orment nnd pop1 l i s m .  
1-. s  h a s  been r�o t e d  i n  c : .  t p t e r  2 ,  G e t u l i o  V<1rc;as arl a p t e d  h i rr:-
s e l f  r o l i  t i c � l l y t o  t::2 new po l i t i ca l  force i n  tr.e c i  tics  by 
I n  a \'C' l.'Y rc�l :.;i:;r::· e , t h e r e -
� ;- ,� - . �  1l l. 1 1. C'' 1 t' . . . . . .  " C "'  ( I r  \ '  • • · · . ·� \., • I ...... l •J I.,, - \."" \. _. 't L ,J , I • ,,, ,.., ' l t:d C- .>f-'�c: i n l ly G ou l;.. c t  
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('..,ho } i :� d  cc.rr:e to power a s  h e a d  of the PT'B and char�i p i o n  of the 
worker ' s  i n t e r e s t s ) hinged on the working c l ri s s e s  in B ra z i l .  
The defeat o f  Vargas i n  1945 by Unrl co Dutra ( a  con­
s e rva t i v e )  marked not only a spl i t  i n  the precar i o u s  l iberal 
a l l i ance ( i ndu s t ri a l i s t  from workers ) but a l s o  a need for more 
advanced t e ch n o l ogy ( ve r t i c a l  i n t egra t i on ) .  T h i s  i s  an econ-
omy wh o s e  growth was dependent on more l a b o r ,  h igher wage s ,  
more i n fa l t i o n ,  and l e s s  i n t e rnati onal trade ( du e  t o  a n  un-
favorable post -',·!orld \','ar Two balance of payments and reduced 
i mp o r t i ng capacity ) .  D i r e c t  U . S .  private investments i n  
B ra z j l doubled from 1946 t o  1950 (Hewl e t t , 1980: 228) . When 
Var6RS regR i n ed power in 1950 h e  i n s i s t e d  that Bra z i l  have 
control over petro l e:u:n ( i n  the form of P e t ro b:.:u. s ,  the state 
o i l  mo�opol y ) , com�un i c� t i on s ,  i ron and s t e e l , and atomi c 
� � t e r i a l s  ( 9o s  �ant� s ,  1974 : 450 ) .  
si;pport 
r ;; e 
th e i r  :3h:�rc of U : e  <-> 1·c .:; .s  i n t e rn;il peo�uct frc.:n 1 6 . 1): L o  2J/; 
b u t  e!"'!f.loyment f e l l  from 9 . 4j� t o  9 . 1% of the workforce 
( rurtnd o ,  1970 : 150) . The significance of t h i s  stage of indu stri -
a l i za t i on l i e s  i n  i t s  nega t i ve effect o n  workers , whom Varg2s and 
G oulart d e pended on a � d  could not afford to a l i enat e .  
Cardoso and F a l l c t o  ( 1978 : 152 ) n o t e  that J u s c e l i no 
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Kubi tschck ( 1955-196 0 )  re-establ i shed the poptJ l i s t  development-
a l i s t  a l l iance using a s trat e gy of " capi tal i zation  with the 
a id of external r e s ources . "  \'i i th the a i d  of foreign l oans 
( 80% of the inflow of foreicn cRpital from 1955-1960 was in the 
form of l�ins )  Kubi tschek was able to pro�ote economic dev-
c lopme11t whi le �ai ntai ning pcliti cal  stabi l i t y  i n  the short 
run. J Unf 01:tuna te ly thi s  \� ould only compound the econom i c  and 
political pro h l cms i n  store for Brazilian pol i t i c ians in the 
early 1960 ' s .  
The economi c  and poli t i ca l  cri s e s  of the early 1960 ' s  
were very much a product of ISI for two �ajor reasons . Fi rst , 
a s  vertical integra t i on became e s s&ntia l , i nfl a t i on i ncreased 
and was further �! {!t:;r?,vated by v;orker d2 rr.;i:1ds for h i t:;r.er -.-.·ae:;e s ,  
�nd a n  increasi ng foreign debt.  � econd , iSI , �hich had 
provid0d so many jobs  and the pol i t i cal  ba�e for pol i t icians 
l i ke \'8.rgas and Goulart , no longer served the i ntcres"!. s  of 
workers. A s  a mat t e r  of fac t ,  increas ed growth would d e pend 
on foreign capital  and t e chnology causing ,  at least ini t i a l ly ,  
inflation and consequent reduction i n  v.'orker buying power 
( which occured during the G oulart adr::ini str'1 t i on ) .  I n  the 
long run this d ependence on foreign i nvestffients i ncluded , as 
we shall see in Chapter 4 ,  �arg i �a l i z a ti o n  of workers ( under-
emp ! oyr::ent ) ,  concentration  of i r:ccme and denationalization of 
domestic  industr i e s . 
�he dyn�rn i c s  o f  I S I  provide i n  theffiselves an explanation 
of i ts d��ise as a precess  of industri a l i z a t i c n .  Eo�c�2r, 
J ·- 1  J 
he:1 � nt .in i t :::; d c vc lo p;1.,:n t ,  ; .;. t Lc:c l n t h e  furth e :c Lr•1n::;f o n  .. �1 ti ons 
of cap i t 8 1 i  !;m ln l h c  c c n t c.::c t h at 1 :i t:'tC:r \'.'o).'J.d ':far T I ,  led to 
the e::t: c <. � t i.t.)n o f  t e chno-ind u :s t 1·ial dcpcnc.h:nc e . 
'J.'r.1� ·�Y:·l o f  t h e  war l e f t  every rna j or pov:cr cle:v:l : ; t ed ..: x -
. ' • •  ('> .. ,. ,.,..
o c c i n: c· d • 
-�I • �- �. C d Si_ a ·t C S • 
"'"'0 · • ·• l. > n J . •. L l. w' 
.. ,. '°' . .t � • I '1 \ • 1 • • •• r'\ I ' l ) ( ' ' t ) f A 1 •• : .. • ... n ' ) ) 
', ' \ ' !• ,.� • <"" ' • ,..,. l 1 - . L I 1 l .. ") ! . '.. # ' l• ' •• \ ....... . . t.. # ... l,... : i." { . 1 ;.  , ... J. L t . . ... .t * ... � t ... v • .; • • ' .;. •. ' .  
W ':l'C �1. 1.e ·� o u +.i l i. z c  the 1a t i · s t  t c < l'T!Ological advances ( i n 
0 J"' . .,..l l·. c t ·� ',•1. l . . •; '1·, ·. 1 ,' ..: ·"' ('J .) l'l'L-. t •• nl' <• ) ,"y l)y fi,..r 1' p\... "" ''a l r: '"' t l• OnS t o - - J ' >. • , .  '" • .  • " <: . . I L  c. I.. ( )<.., � -· • 
· ' i Y ' '  l l  • .. .  , .. l .y , 
dant l::i '.:Jor :'u rcos avn i labJ e i n  dc:p1:ndc n t  s t a t e s .  (Dos S<t n to s , 
1 971} : l; .'; 6 )  
'I:·.e p�·o c l. i  v i  ty o f  late T S T  t o  e l im i na t e  jobs , i ncrea s e  
conc:rn :. :.:·� t. ·i o n  o f  ir:cc:;:e ( d'...�C t o  t h e  expansion o f  l a rcc:n1 cor-
� r �  �- · - r - ) ' •• < � C• - •. � 1. l . . . > , •• • • • (, , C' r �- ·'" Z l• 1 I S ] c· ·· ·  l • • '  'l.' t l• r !} •.•' ', •. C l• .,_ V ... . . ,_ . .. . . .... � . v � .. l . l \., J ' 
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cause infla t i on contributed t o  the end of popu l i sm a s  a 
vehicle for political power. Also , the need for adv, nced 
t e chnology and long t e rm capital investment meant that this 
period of inwardly d i re cted industria l ization ( ISI ) would 
have to be expand ed to include the exporta tion of manufactured 
coeds ( the third stage of Bra z i lian d evelo pw.ent wi thin the 
d cpe�dence framework ) . 
The fol l owing chapter will examine the period of new 
depc:ndence in Bra z i l  after \'.'orld War I I .  Thi s period begins 
i n  Brazi l after the mili tary c oup d ' e tat of 1964 . 
FOOTNOTES- CHAPTER I I I  
1 Evans ( 1976 z J 7 )  notes that wh i l e coffee made up 75% 
of B!·n. 7. i l  • s exports i n  the 192 0 '  s ,  i t  made up only 20% i n  
1970. 
2 l{cwl ett ( 1980 : 40-41 ) calls I S I  a peri od of import re­
f1rodu c tion since  Brazi l i a n  trade barri ers t ended to protect 
o nly luxury goods previously import e d .  Thu s ,  Bra z i l ' s  new 
i ndustri es re fl ect ed i t s  class h i e rarchy . 
� .,; Ecv1lett ( 1 975 : 1 3 8-139)  points out that " I n stru c t i on 
l ? J " , a law implc-r.:ented by Kui t schek,  :favored foreigners in  
both i�port ing cqui�xent and profit  remi ssions through a com­
p l e x  system of E xchange contro l s .  
, , 
I V .  
The final stage i n  the dependent deve l opment o f  Biazil 
w i l l  be cxami�ed i n  this c � a p t 0 r .  S i n c e  1964 B ra z i l  has 
mai ntained econom i c  expa n s i on by pursuing a new pol i cy of 
export led growth. La t e  ISI is now a rea l i ty in depend ent 
B ra z i l .  Deve lo p:r.ent and growth ure :1cw hi r;hly d c pc1 :dGnt on 
fo re i in technology , l ong term invesbr.ents of l!1B. s s i  ve �i:':ounts 
of c�pita l ,  cheap labor and production si t e s ,  and new , 
fore ign markets capabl e of absorbing th e i nc reasi ng amount of 
manu fa cture d  goc d s coming out o f  Bra z i l .  
I n  order t o  revi ta l i z e and now pres erve the dynami c  
nature of th e Brri z i l i an econ or.:y th e cove n:'.'"'.cr.t has h8.d to 
a c cept th e new con d i t i ons of internati cnal ca pi t a l i sm . Devel­
op�ent depends on h igh t e chno l ogy , long term investment , 
massive capi tal requirements , and h igh profi t  margi n s . I n  
turn the home country must be w i l l i ng to provide ch eap labor 
and a favorable investment climate . �ost importantly , the 
h o s t  country must be will ing to redi re c t i t s  e c onomy to the 
needs o f  o t h e r  interr.o. t i c na l  marke t s .  Th i s  i s  the " i nt e r­
na t i onal i zation o f  the i n t e rnal market" that one author ref ers 
t o .  
I n  order t o  understand fuis new pe ri od o f  deve l op�ent , 
i t  i s  necessary to ex2r.:ine tr.e d or.. e s t i c  c c n j i  t i ons that 
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precipitated thi s  cxrort l e d  growth i n  Brazi l .  
THE LEFTI ST DRIFT .._ __ , _  
Joao Goulart was elected Vice-President of Bra z i l  for 
two consecutive terms ( 1955-1961 ) on the strength of h i s  
worker ' s  party ( PTB ) .  Howeve r ,  when h e  came t o  power through 
succe ssion , after Janio Qu�dros resigned the Presidency and 
fled the country, Bra z i l  faced i ts worst economic crisis since 
the Great Depression.  Infl a t i on ,  aggravated greatly by the 
balance of payments defi ci t ,  reached 1 00% in 1 96J and the 
cruzeiro had fal l en from 1 8 0  to the dollar in 1960 to 1 2 5 0  to 
the doliar by November of 196J (Johnson, 1965 : 1 1 ) .  In addition,  
the circulati on of cu�rcncy i n c reased by seventy percent 
i n  that y e n r ,  and G � ?  � � c � t h  r� � e  �e�t down fro� 7 . 7� in 1?60 
( � e e  - . , ..,., , , , <, !; .. ,, .. d c; ) . ..  #'- .. \,.. ....... .._) • • ... - • _,I • • 
Tt 3"!:.E 4 - -
Bra z ilian Rates of Infl a t i on :  1948 - 7 8  
P o t e  of  I nfl�tion 
Year (� 0 n r  yea r )  - --.-- - - · - - 51:·--- - -- --···· - --ci _ _, - -- ·- --- -I°"' · ,  , -, - ,., l :t-8- .;.. :-; ivl l r . 6 
1962-1 964 7 0 . 6  
1965-1 973 2 7 . J  
1974-1 978 J 6 . 6  
1978* 8 0 . 0  
*2stimated 
Source s Hewlett,  1980 : 226 
Bra z i lian Growth Rates , 1921- 78 
Re:il Output 
Growth Rate (%)  
Y ear GDP 
·1921. 1935--- -- 3 ;7 __ _ 
1 9)1-1940 4 . 6  
1 940-194 7 5. 1 
1 948-1 956 6 . 4  
1 95 7-1961 8. J 
1 962- 1 96 7  J. 5 
1 96 8-197) 1 1 . 5  
1 974- 19 7 8  7. 5 
1 979** 7. 1 
*Not Ava i labl e **Esti r::a ted 
Sourc e s  Hewle t t ,  1980:22) 
'i- J  
Agriculture Industr_.y 
J ;-ir ----J. J 
4 . J  5.2 
J. 9 6. 5 
J. 9  8. 8 
5. 8 10. 7 
J. 9 J. 5 
4. 7 l J. 2  
n. a. * n . a . *  
5. 5 7. 8 
The ma j o r  cause of s tagna ted :Sco·11th ra tes was i nflation 
and the balance of payments defi c i t .  A f ter t h e  Kubi t schek era ,  
wh i ch 8.ggra vat e d  both s i tua t ions i n  the 1960' s ,  fore1.g?1crs 
were not w i l li ng to make more l oans for fear of never b e i ng 
rcpayed . The only way for Goulart to obtain bad l y  ne eded 
foreign capital was to do something about the foreign debt �nd 
e s �e c i a l ly i�flati on. 
Goulart was fa ced with a cruc ial d e c i sion i n  t e rms of 
d e a l ing with i nflation.  On the cne hand h e  could implement 
wage fre e z e s  which would be devastating to workers ( consid­
ering a 100% infl a t i on rate ) ,  but be equally h e l pful to 
bu siness by increasing their pro f i ts and , consequen t l y ,  their 
investr:.ent. On the o ther hand , G o ·. i la rt could i ntroduce pri c e  
controls. Th i s  wou l d  f�vor ·::or;: e r s ,  on v:hom G oul art depend-
ed po l i t i c a l l y ,  but it ·:;c � l j  ! "f � u c e  pro f i t s  ; � �1d i �vestrr.ent . 
T h i s  would i n  turn force the dOVe rnment t o  nat i cna l i � e  
i n d u s try , ( e spec i a l l y  foreign i ndustry) and control invest-
m e n t s .  
Goulart ' s  pol i ti ca l  future d epended o n  h i s  n o t  a l i enating 
workers. Yet , pressure from conserva t i ve s  t o  d o  something 
about i nf l a t i on was mounti n g .  Goulart ' s  a t t empts t o  mobi l i z e  
workers behind h i s  very l i beral economic reforms , incl uding 
n a t i o na l i za t i on o f  some industry , were unsucce s s fu l .  Thro ugh 
a nu�ber o f  pol i ti ca l  ffianeuvers d e scribed i n  Chapter one , 
G oulart suffi c i en t ly angered the right and the m i l i tary for 
them to i n i t i a t e  a coup d ' e t a t  i n  March o f  1964 wh i ch forced 
G oulart into e x i l e .  
THE l.Oi'!SERVA'I' 'fVE REPLY ---- - - -- -
T h e  ccup was n e c e s sary i n  order to centrn l i z e  poli t i c a l  
and econom i c  power. Only in t h i s  way could the present m o d e l  
o f  growth through foreign penetration b e  maintained. I t  i s  i n ­
t erest ing t o  see j u s t  h o w  t h e  government o f  Castello Branco 
a s s i mi l a ted t h e  functions o f  the pol i t i ca l  appara t u s to the 
c o nd i t i ons of new d ependence. The author now looks at the 
a u s t e r i ty program o f  R o berto Camp o s ,  Planning iVi i n i s t e r  
under t h e  Branco regi�e . 
Inflati on 
The fight a g a i n s t  i n f l a t i on was approached w i th two 
d i f ferent s t ra t e gi e s .  F i rs t ,  controls were put o n  worker 
w?..ge s .  'l �·1 i s  c r e a t e d  a s i  t ';.la ti on where the buyir:g ;.,o'.-: e r  o f  
work�rs went down twenty-five percent from 1964 to 1967 . 
( Hew l e t t ,  1 980 1 45 ) .  Tava r l: s  and Serra ( 197J a 81 ) n o t e  that 
"worke1� wages have d e c l i ne d  so rad i ca l ly that the legal 
s a l a ry has reverted t o  i t s  post-V.'orld War II sub s i s tence 
l e ve J . "  A s  a resul t ,  large corporations have b e e n  nble to 
2 ch i e v e  h i gh rates o f  pro fi t . 
Se cond , the ava i la b i l i ty of cred i t  was severly r e s t r i c t -
e d .  By e s tabl i sh i ng a Central B2nk t h e  expansi on of 
currency was slowed ( Cardoso and F a l l et t o , 1978 1 2 95 ) .  The 
effect of t h i s  was to force Sffia l l er and l e s s  e ff i c i ent dom-
e st i c  er.t e rpri se s  i n to bHnkruptcy . Dos Santos ( 1974 1 450) 
n o t e s  that from 1964-1966 forrign c a p i t a l  d i d  n o t  i nvest 
h e a v i ly in the e c o nor:iy , rather they s pe cu l a t e d  on t h e  v:eak­
n e s s  of d o m e s t i c  ent erpri s e s ,  buying out those i hR t  could no 
longer a f ford to function because of the l a c k  of ca p i tal . 
Ttese s t ra t eg i e s ,  combined with severe budget cuts 
d e s igned to ba l an c e  t h e  budget , were very s u c c e s s fu l .  I n f la t i o n  
drop�ed frcm 92% i �  1964 t o  4 1 %  i n  1966 , 24% i n  1968 and 2 0%  
i n  1969 (�osc:1baum , 1 9 70 : 1 1 6 ) .  
T h e  CO!'.bi na t i on o f  h i gh pro fi t r"!a rg i ns d u e  to lowe ri ng 
wages and r e s t r i c t e d  c r e d i t  crea t e d  a perfect cl imate for 
t h e  e n t ra n c e  of forci cn ca pi ta l  ar;d the do:-:-: i n<ince of only 
large , strong c o rpora t i o� s .  
Eal a � ce o f  Pavments ------'---- � - --
The balance of payme nt s problem was d ea l t  wi th by 
e � c o u � aging foreien cap i t � l  to enter B ra z i l .  Eeavy inflows 
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o f  foreign cap i ta l  would reduce the d e fi ci t .  T h i s  was d o n e  
largely through t h e  repeal of t h e  1962 profit remm i tance law 
( Howl e t t .  1980 : 45 ) .  A s  Dos Santos ( 1974 : 4 64-465) note s s  
T h e  government perm i t t e d  the entry o f  
c i r culating capital from abroad i n  order 
to finance the d eb t s  o f  n a t i onal enter­
pri se s ,  a need caused by t h e  lack o f  . 
government cred i t .  Thus foreign e n t e r ­
pri s e s  began t o  enter t h e  B ra z i l i an 
finan c i a l  marke t ,  opening t h e  way t o  a 
" takeover" wi thout pre c e d en t  i n  t h e  h i s ­
t o ry o f  world capi t a l i s m .  
T h e  State a s  a n  Econom i c  A c t o r  
Another g o a l  o f  the m i l i tary regime was t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
r o l e  o f  the s t a t e  i n  t h e  economy. A l though t h e y  w e r e  qui te 
i n  favor o f  a t t r� c t i ng foreign capital and adopting the 
c o nd i t i o n s  of i n t e rnFltional c�pi t a l i s m .  the new m i l i t�ry 
l e a d e r s  v:ere n o t  ':J i 1 1. i ng t o  give up to tn.l central o f  tl:e 
e conomy. The i n c r ea s i ng role of the s t a t e  in t h e  e c o no�y i s  
r e presented i n  Table 6 .  T h e  suc c e s s  of t h e  s t � t e  i n  
a ch i e v i ng i t s  goal o f  penetrating t h e  economy i s  e�sy to 
d i s c ern. 
T.l\P.LE 6 
Chf'!!�gc-s i n  Ownersh i p  Arr.ong the JOO t.:·1 rgest 
B ra z i l i an Corpora t i o � s - 1966, 1972 . and 1974 
r.�n nu:facturing 2 nd Petro leum 
S t a t e  Enterpri s e  
Private B ra z i l ia� Firms 
� u l t i nati onal Corporations 
f::8.nU f2 c t u r i  ng 
S ta t e  Enterpri s e  
Priva t e  Braz i l i an Firms 
� u l t i n� t i o n a l  Corporations 
S ou rce ' !� e w 1 e t  t , 19 7 8 r 1 5 7 
Di s t r i bution of N e t  A s s e t s  

















r.�ore can be said about the role of the state in the 
e c o nomy. t�s Evans ( 1979) points o'..lt , t h e  stat e ,  foreign 
invetitors , and loc al industri a l i s t  have entered in a number 
of j o int ventures since the coup of 1964 . Evans refers t o  
t 11 i s  a l l i ance  a s  "Tri-pe. " 1 This re la t i  onship has been 
ref rrred to as a " si tuation of mutual i n d i spensabi l i ty that 
underlies the i r  complex • • •  relationsh i p s "  ( O ' Donnell ,  19781 
1 5- 1 6 ) .  
Tri-pe i s  espe cially profitable between the Bra z i lian 
sta te and 1NC ' s .  �ocal i ndustria li s t s have generally been 
r e s t r i c t e d  to the more trad i t i on:J.l i nd u s tri e s .  The Tri-pe 
or " 13ra zi 1 i8.n r::o ·1 e l .. providc· s  advantages to both the s tate 
and the TNC in j o i n t  venture s in Petroch e� i ca l s ,  hydro­
e l e ctric plan t s ,  and 111� nufc::.c ture of con suJ.er d urables  ( i . e . , 
cars , TV' s  and refrigerators ) .  For the stri t e  this model 
provides access  t o technology, international t rade and financ e 
� a rke t s ,  and t o  the planning of factor i e s .  For TN C ' s  one 
� dvantage i s  that the state provides raw materi al s ,  including 
i n fr� stru c t ure ( road s , transport , e l e c tri c i ty ) .  The state 
a l s o  rem ove s so�e of the risk involved in early inve stment 
�here cost overruns are co��on. This i s  because the state 
generally stands beh i nd the ventures .  :here i s  also a 
d imini shed risk of future expropriation sr.ce i ndustry i s  
har;r.oni zed t o  the nee:l.s of t�e state . ( Eva!l s ,  1977 a 5 5-56) 
I:"-�.U. cnal i z a t i o n  o f  the S t a t e  Bureau cra cy 
7n  addi t i on t o  �he �rc �i ou s ly �e nt i o �ed budge t cuts 
C't' fo i .1.s o c cl lrrcd . F i rs t ,  :r.any j obs v;cre e l imin� ted i n  a t te:r1 p t s  
t o  1 :.i1i:co·;c the ef.f i c i.P-ncy o f  the 1Ju1.·0a u c J ·t1.e;y. 1l1hcse attempts 
i 1 1c 1 ;.ickd h i  t��iCt" prices for l o  c a  1 Gf'1·vi c e s  o n c e  of fe1·ed. 
( ) ' , . .  , ( .  ! t l 03 0 .  4 � ) .. .  ·- • • • , • / J .  / 
1966 : 299 ) .  \:here only 1 , 00 0 , 000 c i t L ·:C;r:s p:�J: '- d  : . , \ l �> in 
1961+ o v e r  5 , 00 0 , 000 p8.yed taxes i n  19'70 ( Poppino , ll}?l : l l 6 ) .  
', l: e Ci.•n"C: r \·a L i  ; e  l·cpl.y L o  the regime o f  Joao G oulart 
i s t  dev�J 1.l1 . .  ent v: i t l1 i n  tJ:c cn• .d i. t i � ·1s o f  new de pend enc e . 
rp J-. e ). r !· ., l '' ., "' ). ,., i' . ' ] 1· ,. ,. 'l ' .... . ,  : . .  - .- 1 1  ·1 ., � ,..,. • 11 ,..,. <.: ,  .., t ') -i- . 1 t i.. t....: . ,.c. .., I . V . t.' i. � . · ' • '* �  .• • l l.,) � 4 • . 1 '7 t • , '.,.; \. ., I.,.,_. (3 
and t h e  m i l i tary2 h::lve j o ined ] n  :->n ; 1 l l i.<·: : i c c  r�r: s i t;nr:d to 
ly C 3 pi t a l i G t  Mod e l .  This has b e e n a c h i e ve d  by � !� S iffi i l a t i ng 
t h e  po l i t i c a l  ;;.pp:-ira l u s  to t h e  rcquirc.rn:ents of t h e  r:.ew i r..-
t C:. r r..a t i cnal c c cino1:·. i c  order b e s t  cr.;n·: :. c t e r 1 z e d  by t h e  " i nter-
n�d i on:'l l.i :-r H t i on of lhe i nt C? i. :Vll :�.�u·l:e t1 1 ( Canloso , 197J : 1 56 ) .  
The e conom i c  succ e s s  o f  t h i s  d e v e l o pm e n t a l  strategy i s  
:J. t t c s t ed. to by t h e  " B ra z i l i a n  T•1 i ra c l e "  of 1 9 6 8 - 1 974 where 
G N P  erew at an an�ual rate o f  over ten percent . The nature 
of t h e  c2.pit r1 l i st expa n s i o n  of Bra z i l  · i s  b e s t  ch�u-;�.c t e ri z e d  
t y  t h e  c;rcwth i n  ;.�� r.ufac turcd indu�: t ri :::: l r. ·q · o r l s  \':h i. c h  m:.; d e  
t; p :. '. : l '.J c r u 1· c c n t  c f  ;.;. J l  C Y. fur t s  i n  J.;·0� <..:nd 't h i r t y  1-·(; l'C: G nt .i ?1 
1974 ( H ewlett , 198 0 i 5 0 ) .  I t  wR s not j u s t  the expansion 
i n  " exports" that s t i m u l a t e d  e;rowth during this period. It 
was the i n c r e a s e  i n  c onsu:ner dura t l e s  l i k e  t e l ev i s i ons and 
automobi l e s  ( Br a z i l  h a s  b0come the ninth largest car prod­
ucer- the i ndustry began after 1955)  wh o s e  pro1u c t i on .  
crow two and one-half tiffies fas t e r  than produ c t i o n  o f  c on­
suffier n on-durable s ( Evan s ,  1976 1 5 0 ) .  
I t  i s  irr:portant t o  remember, howeve r ,  that the " I1r;i r2 c l e "  
wa s "a chi eved by means o f  a n  enorrr.ous increase i n  t h e  rat e  
o f  profit ba sed on a lowering o f  real wage s "  ( D o s  Sant o s , 
l 97lt : l}49 ) . The "marvelous wage d i s c i p l i n e "  characteri z e d  by 
Campos was � a d e  p o s s ible by repre s s i ve control o f  labor 
a c t i vi ty and succe s s i ve " I n s t i t u t i onal /� c t s "  which i n c rec.� s e d  
t h e  r epr e s s i ve capa c i ty o f  t h e  s ta t e . 
A S S OCIATED-DEPENDENT DEVEJ...OPf,'1i::NT 
I nteresti ngly , Cardoso ( 197J : 1 6 J )  de scri b e s  the coup 
d ' e t a t  of r.1arch , 1964 as a '" bourge o i s  economi c  revol u t i o n . '' 
T h i s  author has always c o n s i d ered a " revoluti on" to be more 
than a conso l i d a t i o n  of power by the m o r e  trad i t i onal and 
conservative po l it i ca l nati : nal a c tors . I f  anything t h e  
e x i l e  of G oulart and , subsequently, of o th e r  l e a d i ng l i be ral 
po l i t i cians marked the smothering of any revoluti onary flame 
t�at m i gh t  have ex i s t ed in Braz i l .  
Card o so ' s  chara c t e r i z a t i o n ,  howe v e r ,  d o e s  have some 
l c g i t i�a c y .  � i th out s t e p p i ng i n t o  th eore ti cal q u e s t ions o f  
:·:}-.P:. t a revo l u t i on i s  v:i t h i n  t h e  d e ;: e: ndence conte x t u c. l  a pµrc :::. ch 
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( a  subject broader i n  i t s e l f  than t h i s  the s i s � sorae observ­
a t i ons sho u l d  be made c o nc erni ng the coup o f  1964. 
Econom i c a l l� the coup ended a more than thi rty year 
p e r i o d  of nat i cnally guided ( ev e n  if only t o  preserve a 
po pul i st poli t i cal ba s e  o f  urban worker, etc . ) industriali-
z a � i o n .  T h e  coup wa s :  
economi cally revoluti onary t o  the e xtent 
that i t  pusted the local bourgeoi s i e  t o  
2dapt t o  the beat o f  int erna t i onal cap­
i ta l i st deve lopment , thereby e s tabl i sh i ng 
e n  effective subord ina t i o n  o f  t h e  national 
e c onomy to :r!:.:iern forms of economi c dom-
1 na t i on. ( Card o s o ,  197J : 1 6J ) 
P ol i t i ca lly the coup centra l i z e d  i n  t h e  stat e ,  more 
s p e c i f i ca l ly i n  the e x e c u t i v e ,  the �ost c ru c i a l  pol i t i ca l  and 
e c onc«rr1 i c  d e c i s i on 1:�3. k i ng po· .. :ers.  ':Zhe cr, i e f  exe cutive has 
a l n o s t  unl i m i t e d  power to d eal with TN C ' s ,  dome s t i c  i nd u s t ri -
a l i s t s  and the popula t i o n .  T h e  state ha s b e e n  m o s t  e f f e c tive 
in s tabi l i z ing the dome s t i c  scene t o  pro v i d e  foreign ca p i ta l -
i st s  w i th an a t t ra c t i ve i nvestment c l i�a t e .  
T h e  revolution that C8.rdoso si;eaks �tout i s  or.e t h a t  has 
propel led Bra z i l  t o  s c m i - periph C:ral or sub- i r.: r e r i a l  { d epend-
i ng on one ' s  pre f e rr e d  t e r;r· in o l o(';y ) s t a tu s i n  the v:o rld-
e c o nomy . B1� z i l has fully a ccepted the capi t a l i s t  �odel of 
d e velopment . W i th i n  the B ra z i l ian contex t ,  Cardo s o  ( 19?J ) 
cal l s  t h i s  model " as s o c i a t e d - d ependent developmen t . "  
A s s o c iated-de pendent developrne�t co�bined two formerly 
contra d i c t o ry i d e a s .  Conceptua l l y ,  one peri rheral n� t i on ' s 
d e r: e r:dence i s  ar.other center r:a t i o:n ' s de·;e l o prr.e n t .  
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Cha racteri s t i c  of th i s  model , wh ose l ea d i ng a c t o r  i s  the TNC , 
are 1 )  the im�2rs i o n  of fore i gn i ndustrial cap i ta l  into 
peripheral c; c ono�i e s ;  2) the developrr: e n t  o f  a few dynami c  
industri e s ;  and J )  d ependence on TNC t e chno l og i ca l ,  financial , 
organi za t i onal and market connec t i ons. 
The subordination of the state apparatus to the economic 
v i ta l i ty o f  the nati on has led to a pol i t i cally d e a c t i v�ted 
s o c i e ty �here ffia j o r  vehi cles for pol i t i cal mobi l i za t i o n  and 
expression l i k e  labor uni on s ,  student uni ons ( UNE ) ,  p o l i t i cal 
part i e s ,  and the p r e s s 'Juve a l l  been ( up u n t i l  1979) suppre s s e d .  
The dynami c  features of t h e  country l i e  i n  the promo t i o n  o f  
economi c  growth ( even i f  o n l y  for a few ) .  
A s  evid enced by the 50 m i l l i on Br� z i l i ans ( h a lf the pop­
u l a t i o n )  that lead st�b s i s t a n c e  l i v e l i h o o d s ,  t h i s  model d o e s  
not prevent class attri t i o n .  I t  does have a ��rgi n � l i z i �g 
effe c t  on workers . A s  Table 7 shows , o f  the twenty m i l l i o n  
new wcr�ers s i n c e  192 0 ,  over half have . entered the terciary 
s e c t o r  ( �i l l i ons of marginal urban service workers plus a 
few thou sand lawyers , doctors , e t c . ) .  O � ly one-si xth have 
entered the industrial work fo rce - the r.: o s t  dynamic sector 
i n  the e conor:'ly. 
Struc ture of � h e  ',·:or�force .in Bn1 z i l  
Prir�_ary 
( p  . . ' 1 1  r1nc1p-1 - Y 
S 1: c o ndary 
( P rincipa l l y  
Terciary 
( P rincipal ly 
'I OTAL 
1 02 0  
-67%·----· 
azri c u l ture ) ( 6 . 4  m i l l i o n )  
1 J% 
!r,;;.�·:1i f2 cturing ) ( 1 . J  m i l l i o n )  
2 0% 
s e rvi ce s )  ( 1 . 9  m i l l i on ) *  
1 00% 
( 9 . 6  m i l l i on )  
'1 - 1 2  
1_9_§2 __ 
4J% 
( 1 2 . 5  m i l li on )  
1 9% 
( 5 . 5  mi l l i o n )  
J8% 
( 1 1. 1  mi l l i o n )  
1 00% 
( 29 . 1  m i l l i o n )  
*includes 450 thousand working in " poorly defined oc cupa t i ons . .. 
Sources Evans , 1 9 7 6 1 49 
Tl:ere a l so exists a gross concentra t i c n  of i ncome at 
the top � ( c u u s e  t h i s  � o d e l  st rives on inequa l i t y .  Profits 
d e p end on a super- e xp l o i t e d  work force ; a l so , high te chnology 
a1"ld l art;e cr.rpora t i  c1 r.s rei nforce the cone en t r'1. ti on of income 
i n -tr1e top one p e rcent of t h e  popula t ) o n .  ( S ee T;'l.ble 8 . ) 
Changes i n  Bra z i l ' s  I ncome Distribution 1960-1970 
Per capi tal income ( i n US� ) 
1 Q 60 1070 . LJ  
�owest tiO% 1 1 . 2 9 . 0  
:�ext 4 0%  J4 . J  27 . 8  
�:ext 1 5% 2 7 . 0  2 7 . 0 
?op 5% 2 7 . 4  J6 . J 
T o ta l 1 0 0 . 0  1 0 0. 0 
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�nrei�a l i z 3 t ion of the work force and high i ncome in-
equa l i ty &re the �ost conspi cuous characteri s t i c s  of the 
capita l i s t  �odel o f  a s s o c i a ted-de pendent d e v e l opment i n  Bra z i l .  
FOOTNO'J' E S - CHAPTER I V  
1 Tri-pe means thre e-footed  i n  Portugu e s e .  The maj ority 
o f  j oint venture s , h cw c v e r ,  occur between e i th e r  T N C ' s  and 
the l o cal bourgeoi s i e o r  bE: i.. \'.' L. C n  'f;; C ' S and i.he s t 2 t e  techno­
crats ( no t  between all t�re e ) .  
2 These three gro�ps have made up t h e  rower e l i t e  i n  Bra z i l  
s i n c e  1930 w i t h  th e beginning o f  i�du s t r i a l i z a t ion.  T h e  
bourgeoisie includes b o t h  industrial i s t s  ::::.nd 1ar:d o\':ners 




7here is no evidence that the tendency for e;reater in-
come i r. c qu � l i  ty shown in Table 8 has reversed i t s  el f .  ·,.,'i th 
the recurrence o f  high inflation ( 8 0% in 197 9 )  i t  wou l d  be 
safe to say that th i s  trend, if anything, w i l l  become more 
pervasive. 
A s  technology continues to advance and more foreign 
capital penetrates labor rich Bra z i l ,  undercMpl oyment w i l l  
continue to be a p:t·oblem. The cxploi t a  ti on of workers �nd 
result i ng h igh p1·ofi t mo re;ins a re n.J.l th2t c;->.n sust8.in 
the Brazilian economy. Decause of the p r o f i tabl i ty invol-
ved in exporting manufactured goods from Bra z i l  ( a  trend 
that continues to grow- see T2ble 9 )  i t  will generally be 
advantageous to continue cons tricting consumerism and slow 
the dovelorr:ient of the internal market except a t  the top of 
the population. 
B 1 ·a zi 1 Export Percentages A ccording to Cat egory and Orign, 1 9 7 1 - 7 7  
( exports by i ndu stria l origi n )  
13.1_1.___1972 1 9?J 1974 1 975--1.216 l21.1 
TOT/,L SY.Po;�TS 
1 .t.eri cul tu re 
2 . Mi n i �g Qua rrying 
J . . f' t . • ... anu ... ac uring 
4 . Pood, Eev . Tobac. 
5 .,, t " l  . .. e x . 1 _c s  
6 ,.. d "' d 'C d . 1 0 0 , .. oo , ro • 
? . Pa p e r  2nd Pro d .  
1 00 . 0  1 00 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  1 00 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  1 00 . 0  1 0 0 . 0  
43 . 5  4 0 . 1 J 8 . 4  29 . 6  2 8 . 4  J ? . 4  J4 . 2  
1 1 . 2 8 . o  7 . 9  9 . 5  1 3 . 5  1 J . J  9 . 6  
4 5 . J  5 1 . 8  53 . 7  6 0 . 9 58 . 1  49 . J  5 6 . 2  
2 J . 4  2 9 . 4  2 9 . J 3 1 . 6  2 7 . 6  2 J . O  2 8 .- 1� 
J . 8  6 . 4  7 . 8  8 . 2  7 . 6  7. 1 6 . 9  
J . 8  6 . 4  7 . 8  8 . 2  7 . 6  7 . 1  6 . 9  
. 7  . 9  1 . 0  1 . 1  . 9  . 7  . 7 
. 5 - 1  
8 . Chcm i c a l s  
9 . Non-�etal � i nrl 
1 0 . Basic  � cta l I n d .  
1 1 . �e ta l �anufa c t .  
1 2 . 0 t her Kanf . I n� . 
2 . 4  
. 6  
1 .  9 
5 . 3  
J . 2  
2 . 4  
. 4  
2 . J  
6 . 2  
1 . 0 
Source s W i lki e ( ad . ) ,  1 9 8 0 : 396 
2 . 6  
. 4  
2 . 0  
5 . 6  
2 . 2  
J . 6  
. 4  
2 . 3  
9 . 1  
2 . ) 
2 . 1  
. 4  
2 . 4  
1 0 . 4  
1 . 8  
5-2 
2 . 6  
. 4  
2 . 4  
1 2 . 5  
1 . 0  
Dos Santos ( 1974) � s serts that 9 raz i l has tccoMe a sat -
ellite  producer of manufac tured goods for the cen t e r . I n  
order t o  become such a satel li t e  Dos Santos ( 1974 : 474 ) l i st s  
the following qua l i fi cations.  
1 )  The country mus t  have an already established internal 
!°'H?.l'Y.et  to j u s t i fy i t s  s tatus.  ( A l  though fifty million 
Bra z i lians li ve in rovert y ,  fourty-two mi l l ion have 
resonable income s . ) 
2 )  The country :r:ust be wi l l i ng to give s t ro1�g b'1 ck i ng t o  
a n  export pol i cy . ( Braz i l ,  si�ce the Sranco regiwc-
1964 to 1967- has given tax e xempti ons for export e d 
profits . ) 
J ) The country must a l low unres tri cted re� i t tance of 
profits obtained from vari ous ent rpri ses.  
4 )  The co u ntry ? nust t-e � b l e  to fcrce peopl e to ac cept 
the fact t�at a larse pro d u c t i ve capa ctiy wi l l  al l e viat e 
their present state of mi sery .  
A l l  of these con d i t i on s  exi st in �ra z i l '  to some d egre e . 
Evans ( 1 977)  says tr.at Braz i l ' s  5ood i�1ve s t:..er.t cl imate 
·.-;o•...tl d  be d i ff i c u : t  to 1..;:'!i?1tain i f t:-.e s : :: ".. ;;'s wi 1 l i !".,��: e s s  to 
c :1 zag e i n rep re s s i on ( e g • Ins ti tut i c· �: :i 1 /, c t s . i n c- l · i d  i n g ex i l e s , 
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pre s s  censorsh i p ,  and t h e  o utlaw i ng o f  p o l i t J cal p�rties, 
plus labor and student unions from 1 964�1979) was weakene d .  
�ul t i na t i onal managers are n o t  li kely t o  
m e n t i on the repressive capacity o f  the 
Bra z i l i an s t a t e  as a central p o s i t i v e  
fea ture of Bra z i l ' s good investment c l i rr.a t e .  
but the fact remains that i t  i s  e s s e nt i a l .  
A s  t a b l e  1 0  show s , the combina t i on o f  ' a  repressive 
p o l i t i ca l  arparatus , high inequality of i nc om e , and a 
dynamic econom i c  environment i s  not restri c t ed to Bra z i l .  
T h e  pattern repeats i t s e l f  throughout the l e s s  develope d  capi ­
tal i st worJ d .  
I n  Bra z i l ,  po l i c i e s  by the m i l i tary l e aders have been 
d i r e c t e d  to�ard s s oc i o - pol i tical stabi l i ty with e c onom i c  
cha nge. ;t:obi l i  ty occu:cs e, (!d i s  <"ncourace d  s o  l ong c. s  it 
is n o t Y-ela t e d  t o poli t i ca l  '."'.obj 1 . .i z:..: t i on 0 1 '  C �  � ! ' :J }' t S  the 
c l ::. s s  s o c � e t y .  :·h e  r�. i : :. i �.:::ry ' s  v:·.�y o f  i h 2. :  :.-. � : :..:, 5. � ·_ :-. e o f  
;-r;od e rn conservatism a i r.ied a t  keeping " so c i o .1  l y  q: cn a 
poJ i t i c::i. l ly c l o sed s o c j e ty . "  ( Ca rd o s o ,  1973 : 1 58 - 1 5 9 )  
DC'f.18 :-, 1�. G r.ce v;ri t e r5" Cl s se: rt t h 2 t  d c v e l c-r:nent should be 
studi ed from an internat i cnal perspe c t i v e .  The primary ob­
j e c t i v e  of th i s  t h e s i s  h a s  been to u t i l i z e  t h e  derendence 
approach to study t h e  nati onal deve l o pment of Bra i l .  Spec­
i f i ca l l y ,  thi s the si s has a tt empt ed to e s tablish three 
· hypothese ini t ially d i s c u s s ed in chapter 1 .  
'!' /', BLE 1 0 
Some Examples of Successful but Oppressive Growth Strategies i n  the Capitalist Third World 
Countr 
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Growt� o:' G� P ( l  
10.5 
1 0. 3  
1 0. 2  
9 . 9 
9.8 
Dominican Repub. 8 . 4  
�ndonesia 7. 8 
N i c;cria 7. 8 
'fur key 7.4 
?araguay 7. 0 
':'hailand 6. 7 
?hilippines 6 . 4  
Ni caragua 5 . 9 
r.�cxico 5.5 
Proport i on of 
Kational I r.come 
' Captured by the 








n . a . *  
61% 
61% 
n . a .  
46% 
55% 
n . a .  
64% 
*:·; o t  available ; Source : Hewlett , 1 980 : 222 
Violation o f  ? o ! i t i :al a � d  �� �� l � �  � � -
Authoritarian rul e ,  s e lf-censors h i p  o �  
pre s s ,  p o l i t ical prisoners , i l l ega� �rre s ·  
One -Party state , state-controlled press 
political prisoners 
J.uthoritarian rul e ,  press censorsh�� . pc l ­
i tical prisoners and execut i ons , wide­
spread torture 
Authori tarian rul e ,  press censorship , 
p o l i t i cal prisoners 
Authori tarian rul e , politi cal pri soners . 
State-controlled election s ,  torture 
Political Prisoners , illegal arre sts , 
and detentions 
Authoritarian rul e ,  political prisoners , 
press censorship 
Authoritarian rul e ,  summary trials and 
executions 
Political prisoners , i l l egal arrests , 
torture 
Authoritarian rul e ,  most civil and pol­
i t i cal freedoms suspended , wide spreaa 
torture 
Authoritarian rul e .  self-censorship of 
press ,  politica �  prisoners 
Martial law, political prisoners , press 
censorship ,  torture 
Authoritariar. rul e ,  most civil and p o l ­
i t i cal �reeGoms suspended , press censor­
ship ,  torture 
One-party 3tate , some arbitrary arre sts 
and detentions 
5 - 5  
el opmen tal evolution o f  Bra z i l .  This approach analytically 
d ivides the peri od s of d e velopment in B ra z i l  into the era 
o f  the export ec o n 0 my ( 1822-19)0 } ;  the stage o f  impo rt sub­
s t i tuti on ( 1 9) 0 - 1 964 ) ;  and , the peri od o f  export-l ed growth 
( 196�-pre sent } .  Thus , depend ence contr�butes to a better 
understa�d ing of dcYelop:.:ent by ca ter;ori z ing i t  into different 
pe riods wh i ch depi c t  ffia j o r  d e v e l opmental trend s .  
Second , thi s the s i s  has attempted t o  shew the dynami cs 
of early and late import subs t i tut i o n  indus triali zation 
contributed to the pol i t i ca l/ecor.om i c  cri s i s  of the early 
1960 ' s . Early ISI led to a n  expans io n  of both domestic 
i nd ustri al output and the workfo rce .  Pol i t i ca lly th i s  pro­
v5 d ed pol i t i cians with a new power ba s e  which grew in t o the 
rr.ovc:-: c:1t c2 l l ed po.r-ul i sm . Econc mi cally, be C:lUSe e1�c:.z i l .  s 
c -:-·::'c �'-1. � r = ::- c :-·�'�·d 5. n P: e f·� ce o f  the cor.t racti cn of the i;. : c !:'­
n:-: U c::2l :' � :!.'k•=- t ,  i :· � -c:· t i :1:5 cr� J: r. city fe l l .  Late I S I  l ed t o  
inYe stmcnts o f  furP � c;n C�pi t �� l  t•(.·C<·.: : .e l:t? C C S S3.ry i n  o rd er t o  
r..aintain growth by im provi ng p1 o.:l�e; t i  vi ty.  The r e s u l t  was 
h i gh inf2.a ti on aet;r� vated by 'r.c;_vy b:"l l � r.ce of J.·:.; y:': e n t s  defi ­
c i t s .  Thi s char.ge of empr.a s i s  from hori zontal to vertic?l 
e xpan s i o n  not only caused high inflation and ba lance of pay­
m e n t s  defi c i t s ,  i t  a l so contributed to the end of popul i sm a s  
a veh i c l e  for pol i t i ca l  power. 
Fina l l y ,  this th esi s ha s hypothesized that pol i t ical in­
s t i t u t i ons i n  B ra z i l  }-·. · :vP : .- ._ ,: �· c: s i •·: i l c:. t e d  to thP. � e e d s  of 
capi t al i st c�te:r� !-: !...· e .  -� �: .:. s  � - �= s  r::.. e:. n  a c c ompl i shed b:,' stc·.-;ing 
how the coup of 1964 enabl e d  Brazil to adpt itself to the in-
t e rnational e c onomic condidtions characterized by the predom­
ir.ance of the TNC . Economically, the post-1964 regime has 
encouraged foreign investment in Brazil. Favorable conditions 
for investment have been maintained by reducing worker wages 
which ircreased busin e s s  profi t s ; and restricting credit 
which forced small businesses into bankruptcy. This new 
develop�ent policy has depended on foreign investment advanced 
technology and a redirecti on of the domestic economy to the 
n e e d s  of external market s .  
Political l y ,  the regime has repr� ssed most forms of 
opposition to i t s  d e v e l o p�ent p o l i c i e s .  Thi s ha s been done 
by pas sing � r.uober of i n s t i t u t i onal a c t �  which byra s s  con-
s t i t u t i onal guarantees and , amc�g otter t h i ngs , invo�cd press 
cc!lsor�'.:.i ;:- .  �::-·. d e u ::i o::1s t�e arm o f  t h e  ;ove rn::ier.t , 2 �- d  re-
orgRni z e d  political part i e s . 
S ; r c�:.� s t i cn on the future of Er2 ::: i l  must t2ke .:.. :1to 
c o n s i d e ra t i o n  a n.: :·:L. cr cf fac tors th :-: t w i l l  j nf l uence the 
i t  s h o u l d  be n c t e d  that since the coup in 1964 ,  Bra z i l ' s  
foreign d eb t  ha s doubled every three years ( 60 b i l l ion 
d ollars in 1980 ) . Second, successive devaluation of the 
cruzeiro has beccffie a regular remedy to stimulate exports 
and control inflation. Planning �ini s ter D elfim Netto proposed 
a J O%  ar.d 40% d c va l'.Aation for 1 9 7 9  and 1980 respectively 
( n� n - r. 0 1  · 59 )  " � d. J� · • / 1-' .l •  • � l � � l ly the E ra z i l i an ec ono�y w i l l  ccntinue 
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to depend on bieger and more effi c i e � t  corporate enter-
pri ses in ord er t o  m: · intain i t s  role as an exporter of man-
ufactured good s .  This is  a result of the first two factors 
because foreign capital i s  sought to finance the external debt 
and foreign capi tali sts are attracted to the favorable climate 
for the exportation of industrial goods .  
From a broader perspective the. future development of 
Brazil i s  best summari zed by Dos Santos ( 1974 : 486 ) .  
The struggle between socialism. as the 
only popular solution.  and fascism,  a s  
the only capitalist alternative , will 
continue to  be the key to  ( it s )  histori-
cal pro c e ss . 
· 
BIBLI OGRI-. PHY 
A lve s ,  �arcio M o re i ra 
1 972 1 1 U r·ban G ue 1'ri l l a s  and the T e rrori s t  S ta t e . " Pp • .5 1 -
6 7  i n  H .  Jon R o s c nb2um and W i l l iam G .  Tyler ( ed s . ) ,  
Contempora�ra z i l .  New York : Praeger Pub l i s h e r s .  
And e r s o n ,  Robin L .  
1 978 " Brazi l ' s  lii i l i  tary Regime Under F i re . "  Current 
l_� i St 0.£.Y. t ( I I -7 5 : 61 -6 _5 + • · 
Earnr::· t ,  Ri c i :<1 rd J .  nnd P. o n a l d  E .  �.:u J  l e r  
1974 Q.1��1;.0_1_?.�<� c·h ,  New York r S i m o n  and S chuster. 
Bl a c k ,  Jan Er: i pr e r s  
1 977 U . S .  P e n e t ra t i on i n  Brazi l ,  P h i lad elphia r Uni versi t y  
· or  Fennsyl vani a P r e s s  Inc . 
Capora s o ,  J2 m e s  A .  
1978 "Depc:idence and Dependency in the G l obal S y s t em . "  
Jn_!_c· 1�0 a t i onal O rga n i � a t i on J2 : 1 - 1 J .  
Ca1'd o so ,  f eni2ndo Henri q u e  
1973 "�. ssoc L :.i  t e d -Dc:pcn,i e n t  Jevc l . o  l� :··. en t :  T h  e oret i  ca 1 and 
Fr:J. c t i c a l  T rn n l i ca t i ons . "  P p .  1 1�2-1 76 in A l fred 
S t e r.hen ( ed . ) , f'. u t h o ri t a ri a n  3 ra z i 1 .  New l iaven : 
�Rle u n i  vprsi ty-·11;��e-ss-.
--·--- --·-·· - ·-
Card o � o , Fer�ando H .  and Enzo Fal e t t o 
1 978 P012c r d c n cy and DevJ o urrent i n  Lat i n /.i!T;erj ca , Los 
A r.sel e s 1  Unive rsi ty o f  C a l i fornia Pre s s .  
Ch i l c o t e ,  Ponald H .  
1972 "A Q u e stion of Deoendenc e . "  :.a t i n  /,rr. e r i ca R e s earch 
Review 1 3 : 55 - 68.  -
Da s si n ,  ,Jo;;.n R .  
1979 " A  � e port o n  l : u :·i;�n R ] ch t s  i n  : . r  ..!, z i l :  !'-. 2 (; p o r t  as of 
�.�arch , 197 9 . "  Uni versal Hurr.�l'.l..B.iB.h t s  1 ' J5·- 1� 9 . 
D o s  � a n t o s , T h e o t o n i o  
1968 "Foreign I nvestr.wnt n.nd Large Enterpr i s e  in Latin 
Arne r i ca a ri'h e  3ra z i l i a n  Ca s e  S t udy . "  P p .  431-435 
i n  James Petras and �au r i c e  Z e i t l i n  ( eds . ) ,  Iat i n  
J.. r�.eri ca : Re form o r  Revolut i o n .  New York : Fa we et t 
Fubl i c a  t i  o nsinc �--- --
1 970 "'lhe S t ructure of Dependency . "  !1m r; r i can Economic 
R �vi ew 6 0 : 2 J 1 -2J6. 
1974 " Bra z i l . "  Pp. 4 09-'�90 i n  Ronald H .  C h i lcote and 
J o e l  c. Edel s t e i n  ( eds . ) ,  I a t i n  Ame r i c a :  The S t ru��l e  
� t_�h_De2e ndency and B e;y:ond . New Yorks S c h enkrnan 
rubl i sh j ng Company I n c .  
Duva] l. , R<lyr:1ond 
1 9'18 " D e p e n d e n c e  and Dependencia Theorya 
Pre c i s i on of Concept and f.. q:;umen t .  •• 
Ql_'F:·2.?JJ_?'.}�·�J.Ql1 J2 : 51 -78. 
N o t e s  Towards 
Int e rn::i ti on::i l -� ... · - - - -
Dy e ,  !">a v i d  !i .  r' nd Carl o s  Ed-.·.-<"n·Jo d e  Sou?. a  e S i lva 
1979 "A Perspe c t i ve on t h e  Bra z i l in n  S t a t e . "  !.:..?JJn 1-.m�:r_i_c:'in 
29s ea rc;h Rev.t� t LL : 81 -98. 




" Continui t i e s  and Contradi c t i on s  i n  the Evolution of 
Bra z i l i a n  Denenden c e . " J,a t i n  Arneri ca P e r s p e c t i v e s  
3 '  J0-54. 
. . 
J , 
.. i.!ul t i  na t i  on:;i l , S t a t e  Cwr.ed Corpora t i o n s ,  Rnd the 
TraJ"'lsforrnation o f  Imperia l i s m i  A B ra z i l ian Case Study" 
E<;:_Q}1Q.T_'! i c  DeveJ �!Tic nt and Cul iura l_ C:t<\r._g� 2 6 : 4J-64.  
D0pc�1'1C'QL12_ev e l_C2..Pl�.e!1!, , Princ e t on Uni versi t y  Press . 
fagc n ,  R i chard 
1977 
1978 
.. S tudying La t i n  Ameri can Poli ti c s :  Some Impli cations 
of a Dependence A p proach . "  L a t i n  A � e ri can R e search 
R eview 1 2 a J-26. 
"A Funny Thing H;;i. ppened on the ::.'ay t o  the r.�a r k e t :  
'I h ot;gh t s  o n  extend i ng Dependency I d e a s . "  ::'.' ::__:t c-�.::_�� �:.:t.i.".:::�J:. 
Or.sE�ni � a t i o n s  J2 : 287-JOO.  
Fon1.0n ,  Sh eppard . 
1971 " Di suni ty and D i scontent s A Study of P e;:i san t Pol-
i ti cal r,�ovements i n  B ra z i l . "  Jo_urnal of La t i n  Amer­
i.�§n �-!_��.SU e s  J s J-24. 
Furta d o ,  CeJ so 
1 9 7 0  
Ga l l , 
1977 




i.'b�::; t::. c l i:: : s t o  Dcve 1 o c:nent in I.atin America , New Y o r k :  
Dc\;clt'l�:-!�e-nta1"1cf Cc•rr:pany I n c .  
· 
' ' ·"T' 1 ·. e  ,r., l. >"', ::> f "'"' a · , " C t 63 1' 5 5 5  . - �  o .or Z l .i.. ommen a ry : ..,.. - • 
" F:r"::. z i l :  .0e:r.ocr::i.cy or D i c t a torship" Commonweal 1 07 :  
23'7- 2 4 0 .  
"The B l.�a z i l i.::in E c 0 nomy : Structural ! ee:;a c:i. es 2.:-id F u ture 
Prospe c t s . "  Fp. l OJ-148 i n  ·;; i l liam H. O v e rh o l t  ( ed . ) ,  
T h e  F u t u r e  o f  3r2 z i l .  Boul d e r :  � e s tview �rc s s . 
Graha:-n , Eichard 
" Er;:; z i l ' s  D i l emma" Current J-; i s t o ry 52-53 : 291 -297+ . 
Hewlet t ,  Sylvia :. nn 
1 975 
1 978 
1 98 0  
" 'T 1 1 i:>  .,.;· n·::-:- .. · 1· c s o f  Pconomi· c  T ,.,., r: eri' a l i· sm · . . . � l j'  • .  - � 1 .  • . • • .. : .i .t"' · • •  
? m :· e i c n D i r e c t  I nv e s tment i n  Bra z i l . "  
P �r � r- � c t  i Yes 2 :  1 J 6 - 1  l�. 9 .  
T h e  P. o l e  of 
I.a t i n  Ame ri can 
''The S t<:: .t e  �:lnd Br·a z i. l ian Ec or.c;'l i C  Devel opment : The 
Co!'1t :::�;:I.:· o rary ? c a l i  t y  o.nd Pros_:;:)ect s . "  Pp. 149-2 1 0  in 
� i l l i�� E .  C v e rh o l t ( ed . ) ,  !h e Future of Bra zi l .  
? � u l d er :  � c s tview Pres s .  
T h e  Cruel D i l e�mas o f  Deve l o r� e n t z  Twen t i e th Centurv 
'3r2 z i J , Ne·w Y o r k s  :Sasi c Books ?ubl i s h e  r s .  
_._.. 
Hi rschman, Albert o .  
1 978 " n  d � t C · t · 1 ". .... • •  lf v �Gyon r. synime ry : r1 l ca : , c .. e s  on ,1,y se a s  a � our.g 
l·:. � n  and c:.o� .•. e 0-11.\,. , " r Fri· E'1dS II ,.. ,.., t .-.rn- t i• on" l f""r ..,- ·� n i Z '" t J' or � ......... - J j \,.. - £ • ..!. ' 1  � � � -�· _ _:_·--�� ... ;�--·-·· ..::----. ... � 
J2 : 45-51 . 
Johnson , John J .  
1965 " � r:-;. z i l  i n a Quanclry . "  Current _H.i stor:t 48- 49 : 9-
1 5+ .  
Levi n e , R obe rt M .  
1 979 
1 980 
'Tr� z i l ;  !Je f 1.nit.i on of '..'c� . . .)cr<J cy . "  Ci�r� n t  Hi�1:9.!X 
7 8 - 7 9 : 1.;.<J-52 . 
" Er�:iz i l r  Democracy V.' i t } 1 ou t  !1d j ective:s . "  C:urr�nt 
Hi�t� 78- 7 9 � 49-52. 
l\iendes ,  Cand i d o  
1 980 " T h e  Post-1964 Bra z i l ian Regirr. e : Cutward R ed c: rn o cr2. t ­
i 2a t i on and I n;-i e r  Institutiona l i za t i on . "  G overnment 
n�-�d Cppo����.i-2.D. 1 5 : 4 8-74. 
Moore1 y ,  SR?r:uel A .  /,nd Gordon W .  Smi t h  
1977 11'i'he C h o i c e  of 'I' cchr;oJ. ogy : :r: u l  tina t i onal Firm s i n  Brc;.z i 1 . "  
P. C?.9_� i,- �0_.i_.C::.. _r_s::._::1� l.l?l?.!.:-:_c>I_l-t_ ���..J:.1:.1.l tura 1 ChanEse 2 5 :  239-2 61}. 
Motta , Paulo R o t 2 r t o  
1972 " E l i t e  Control and ? o l i t i ca l  -:-:� r t i c:i p1 t .i on in l h c  l'a r t y  
S y s t em . "  P p .  21 )-227 i n E .  J o n  S o �.;c-nt-2 �.rn 8 nd '1·i ) l l i ci.m 
G .  Ty l er ( ed s . ) ,  Co!1t en_1porC3.IT Br�:t7.j _l. ::ew Y o r k s  
Pracger Publ i sh e r s .  
Myhr, f.obert o .  
1972 " S t u d e nt /:. c t i v i sm ar:d D e v e l opment . "  P p .  J49-J69 i n  H .  
Jon R o senbaum and � i l l i am G ,  T y l e r  ( ed s . ) ,  Contemporary 
_g_r�zj_J:.. N ew Y o r k s  Praeger Pub l i s h e r s . 
N ewfflrr:.er , R i chard s .  and <; i l l<lrd : : u e l l e r  
1975 "!.�ul tin:"! t i or.n.l C orpo rati ons i n  B ra z i l and M e x i c o : 
...: truc turf11 S o u r c e s  o f  E c o n om i c  and r':on - e c onomi c Power . "  
'.\' :.i. s�! i nsto n R epo rt t o  the Subcomm i t t e e  on ii'iul t i na t i on­
a l s ,  Coffi� i t t e e  on Foreign Re l a ti ons , U . S .  S e na t e .  
O ' Don�e l ,  Guillermo 
1 9 78 " 'R e f l e c t i on on the Patterns of Change in the Bure2u­
c 1 ·a t i c-Authori tari2;: S t a t e . "  18.t i n  .. �. s_ri ca� R e s e a rch 
Z:_c·v Lew 1 J a 3-)8 
?ang, Eul-Soo 
1981 " 11 bert ura in Bra z.i 1 :  A Road t o  Chao s . "  
Hi �!.QT....Y 8 0-81 1 5 7-61+.  
Current --- -
Poppino ,  Rol l i e  F. .  
1 969 
1971 
" Sr2 z i l :  S e c c·�-�'1 FL a s e  of the Revolu t i on. " 
tu��1..<?_ry .5 6 - 5 7 :  6 - 1 2+ . 
Current -------
" Braz i l ' s  •-;.'h i  rd G o ·:u r!'lment of the R evolut i on . "  Cu:r:-x.�� nt 
tLi S t O£.'i.  60-61 : 1 02 - 1 0 7+ • 
Rolim, S i l v i o  
1 979 " 13raz i l  • s Jifri c:.:n 9r:i.v e . "  I:.at�_r1 /.rneri can g, _ _Ql1ual 
R eview 78 : 4 J- 4 7 .  
Romning, c .  Neale 
1966 " B·c� z i  1 • s Re vol u ti onary Goverr1ru:nt . " furrcnt H�J?J.2-1::.Y 
50-51 1 2 96-J OO+ . 
P.osen 1.s1 U!i1 , H .  J o n  
1 970 " P r� z i l  f s �:ii li t;:1ry Regime. " Current Hi story 58-59:  
7J-78+ . 
Tave res , :'.'! • C • c:..:. n d .Jo s c: S 0 ! -ra 
1973 " Ee�· or.d S t ;:i £7i<l t i o n :  t', d i �; c t� · : i on e n  t �1 e  :·:<� h.:."!··e of ? c c e n t  
Deve l o p:nE·:tt i n  .3r<� z i l . "  P r .  ( 1  .. 9 9  i n  .�-.., iu.:s 
Petras ( ed . ) ,  !.q t i n  /, r:-.l·:C i ca : ? !·orr. �--c: ;· c riC. t t·, � e  to � 0V­
oluti on . N ew Yorks-"JoFn - :�',' i1-ei-.:-�i1ct" .s G!:-S -:fr�c .  
· - - - - -
Tul li s ,  F .  La�ond 
1973 I'_gJJ:.ii c�_l__and S o c i al Change in T h i rd i'.'orld .. _.�o-�!.0.�I:') _e_'.?. , 
�ew Yor k :  John W i l ey and Sons I n c .  
Valenzue l a ,  J .  S<1r1uel and i1rturo Valenzuela 
1978 ' T o d e rr.i z!! t i o n  ?..r:d I.>.:pc:�1der!cy : A lt ernative Perspe c t i ves 
i n  the St;_uiy of �-a tin f.:::eri can l:r:d erd evelop:r:ent . "  
Corq: :-i r;i t i_y_e _ _P9.:l_j.: t i  c s  1 0 :  535-5 5 7 .  
Wall erstei n ,  I r.-.n:arn�el 
1974 "The R i s e  and ;-· u t u1·e '..ic-r; ise of the ·,·: orld Ca ::i tali s t  
Syst er:: i Concept s f o r  Cor:-:para t i ve ;'...na lys i s . " - �-�:r.-
�"'8. r::. t i_ � g__ S t v rl .L�.§_i_r.i_----�-C?. i e t y and E i s t  � ry 1 (. : J � 7 - � 1 5 • 
1976 " Se!;.i - ? e r i  1 .. : . ·.-r:1 l C c.''J.1 1 1  ri es and the Contc.-rnporary Worl d 
C ri s i s . "  TJ:l!.c1f'Y � ! ·:d .. e:�ri_ �_tx J : 461-48J. 
Wa ll erstei n ,  � i �h a e l  
1980 " T h e  Co 1 lc.pse of Dcr.-jocracy in Bra z i  1 s I ts Econor.1i c 
C' e te rrni. na nt s . "  La.t i n  !�mcr i can Il_e sear_�h..fL�.Yi�w 1 5 : 2-40. 
Wass erstrom, RoL&rt 
1980 " :? ra 7. i l s  G enocide i n  the Jungl e . "  Commonweal 1 07 : 2 4 0 -
2 4 2 .  
W i l k i e ,  J;1r.;es w .  ( e d . ) 
1980 S ta t i s t i 6a l  Abstract of La t i n  Ameri ca , Los hngeles i 
Ut)i versi ty of. Cal i fornia Pre s s .  -
